Time passed away, and the 2d February, 1833, the day when the first instalment under the treaty became due, arrived. It was to be paid “into the hands of such person or persons as shall be authorized by the Government of the United States to receive it.” The money on that day ought to have been ready at Paris. But strange, but most wonderful as it may appear, although the Chambers had been in session from the 19th of November until the 2d of February, the king’s government had never even presented the treaty to the Chambers,—had never even asked them for a grant of the money necessary to fulfil its engagements. Well might Mr. Livingston say, that they had never properly appreciated the importance of the subject. The Government of the United States, knowing that the king in his speech had promised to present the treaty to the Chambers, and knowing that they had been in session since November, might have taken means to demand the first instalment at Paris on the 2d day of February. Strictly speaking, it was their duty to do so, acting as trustees for the claimants. But they did not draw a bill of exchange at Washington for the first instalment, until five days after it had become due at Paris. This bill was not presented to the French government for payment until the 23d of March, 1833. Even at that day the French ministry had not presented either the treaty, or a bill to carry it into effect, to the Chambers. The faith of France was thus violated by the neglect of the king’s government, long before any bill was presented. They, and not the Chambers, are responsible for this violation. It was even impossible for the Chambers to prevent it. Had this treaty and bill been laid before them in time to have enabled them to redeem the faith of France, the loyalty of the French character would never have permitted them to be guilty of a positive violation of national honor. The faith of the nation was forfeited before they were called upon to act. The responsibility was voluntarily assumed by the king’s ministers. The Chambers are clear of it. Besides, the ministry were all powerful with the Chambers during that session. They carried everything they urged. Even the bill providing the means of guaranteeing the Greek loan became a law. Can it then for a single moment be believed that if a bill to carry into effect our treaty—a treaty securing such important advantages to France—had been presented at an early period of the session, and had been pressed by the ministry, that they would have failed in the attempt? At all events, it was their imperative duty to pursue this course. The aspect of the political horizon in Europe was still lowering. There was still imminent danger of a general war. France was still in a position to make her dread any serious misunderstanding with the United States.