“The President, in desiring the undersigned to request that his sentiments on this subject may be made known to his majesty’s government, has instructed him also to state his expectation that the king, seeing the great interests now involved in the subject, and the deep solicitude felt by the people of the United States respecting it, will enable him, when presenting the subject to Congress, as his duty will require him to do at the opening of their next session, to announce at that time the result of that appeal, and of his majesty’s efforts for its success.” Had this letter of Mr. McLane placed a different construction upon the engagement of the French government from that which Mr. Serrurier intended to communicate, it was his duty to make the necessary explanations without delay. He, in that case, would have done so instantly. It was a subject of too much importance to suffer any misapprehension to exist concerning it for a single moment. Notwithstanding all which had passed, the President, on the faith of these assurances of the French government, suffered Congress to adjourn without presenting the subject to their view. This rash, this violent man, instigated by his own good feelings towards our ancient ally, and by his love of peace, determines that he would try them once more, that he once more would extend the olive branch before presenting to Congress and the nation a history of our wrongs. I confess I do not approve of this policy. I think the time had then arrived to manifest to France some sensibility on our part on account of her delay in executing the treaty. I believe that such a course would have been dictated by sound policy. What were the consequences of this new manifestation of the kindly feelings of the President towards France? Was it properly appreciated by the French government? Was it received in the liberal and friendly spirit from which it had proceeded? Let the sequel answer these questions. I shall read you Mr. Livingston’s opinion on the subject. In a letter to Mr. Forsyth, under date of the 22d November, 1834, he thus expresses himself: “I do not hope for any decision on our affairs before the middle of January. One motive for delay is an expectation that the message of the President may arrive before the discussion, and that it may contain something to show a strong national feeling on the subject. _This is not mere conjecture: I know the fact_; and I repeat now, from a full knowledge of the case, what I have more than once stated in my former despatches as my firm persuasion, that the moderate tone taken by our Government, when the rejection was first known, was attributed by some to indifference, or to a conviction on the part of the President that he would not be supported in any strong measure by the people, and by others to a consciousness that the convention had given us more than we were entitled to ask.”