Now, sir, my position is, that when the Constitution of the United States, in a special case, has conferred upon the Senate, which is essentially a branch of the legislature, a participation in executive power, you cannot by construction extend this power beyond the plain terms of the grant. It is an exception from the general rule pervading the whole instrument. Appointment to office is in the strictest sense an executive power. But it is expressly declared that the assent of the Senate shall be necessary to the exercise of this power on the part of the President. The grant to the Senate is special. In this particular case, it is an abstraction from the general executive powers granted under the Constitution to the President. According to the maxim of the common law, _expressio unius est exclusio alterius_—it follows conclusively that what has not been given is withheld, and remains in that branch of the Government which is the appropriate depository of executive power. The exception proves the rule. And the grant of executive power to the Senate is confined to appointments to office, and to them alone. This necessarily excludes other executive powers. It cannot, therefore, be contended with any force, as the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) has contended, that because the consent of the Senate is made necessary by the Constitution to appointments of officers,—that, therefore, by implication, it is necessary for their removal. Besides, these two things are very distinct in their nature, as I shall hereafter have occasion to demonstrate. But to proceed with the argument. I shall contend that the sole power of removing executive officers is vested in the President by the Constitution. First, from a correct construction of the instrument itself; and second, even if that were doubtful, from the great danger resulting to the public interest from any other construction. The Constitution declares in express language that “the executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.” Under these general terms, I shall, once for all, disclaim the idea of attempting to derive any portion of the power of the Chief Magistrate from any other fountain than the Constitution itself. I therefore entirely repel the imputation, so far as I am concerned, which would invest him with executive powers derived from the prerogatives of the kings or emperors of the old world. Such arguments are entirely out of the question.