“The association of the Senate with the President in exercising that particular function, is an exception to this general rule, and exceptions to general rules, I conceive, are ever to be taken strictly. But there is another part of the Constitution which inclines, in my judgment, to favor the construction I put upon it; the President is required to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. If the duty to see the laws faithfully executed be required at the hands of the Executive Magistrate, it would seem that it was generally intended he should have that species of power which is necessary to accomplish that end. Now, if the officer, when once appointed, is not to depend upon the President for his official existence, but upon a distinct body, (for where there are two negatives required, either can prevent the removal,) I confess I do not see how the President can take care that the laws be faithfully executed. It is true, by a circuitous operation, he may obtain an impeachment, and even without this it is possible he may obtain the concurrence of the Senate for the purpose of displacing an officer; but would this give that species of control to the Executive Magistrate which seems to be required by the Constitution? I own, if my opinion was not contrary to that entertained by what I suppose to be the minority on this question, I should be doubtful of being mistaken, when I discovered how inconsistent that construction would make the Constitution with itself. I can hardly bring myself to imagine the wisdom of the convention who framed the Constitution contemplated such incongruity.” But, sir, if doubts could arise on the language of the Constitution itself, then it would become proper, for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of the instrument, to resort to arguments _ab inconvenienti_. The framers of the Constitution never intended it to mean what would defeat the very purposes which it was intended to accomplish. I think I can prove that to deprive the President of the power of removal would be fatal to the best interests of the country. And first, the Senate cannot always be in session. I thank Heaven for that. We must separate and attend to our ordinary business. It is necessary for a healthy political constitution that we should breathe the fresh and pure air of the country. The political excitement would rise too high if it were not cooled off in this manner. The American people never will consent, and never ought to consent, that our sessions shall become perpetual. The framers of the Constitution never intended that this should be the case. But once establish the principle that the Senate must consent to removals, as well as to appointments, and this consequence is inevitable.