It was contended in the first Congress, and the same argument has been urged upon the present occasion, that the power of removal was not recognized by the Constitution—that it was a case omitted, and that, therefore, by implication, it belongs to Congress. This argument was fully met and successfully refuted in 1789. If this principle were established, the executive power would have no necessary control over executive officers. Congress might confer the power of removal upon the Senate alone, or upon the House of Representatives alone, or upon both conjointly, without any participation of the President. This Government—the admiration of the world, would present the solecism of an executive without any control over executive agents, except what might be granted to him by the legislature. We are not placed in this unfortunate predicament. The President, under the Constitution, has the power of removal. It is a constitutional power, not to be controlled by the legislature. It is a power equally sovereign in its nature with that of legislation itself. He is a co-ordinate branch of the Government, and has the same right to exercise his discretion in removals from office, that Congress possess in regard to the enactment of laws. This brings me to consider the constitutionality of the third section of the bill now depending before us. It provides “that in all nominations made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned by removal from office, the fact of the removal shall be stated to the Senate at the time that the nomination is made, _with a statement of the reasons for such removal_.” Whence do we derive our authority to demand his reasons? If the Constitution has conferred upon him the power of removal, as I think I have clearly shown, is it not absolute in its nature and entirely free from the control of Congress? Is he not as independent in the exercise of this power as Congress in the exercise of any power conferred upon them by the Constitution? Would he not have the same authority to demand from us our reasons for rejecting a nomination, as we possess to call upon him for his reasons for making a removal? Might he not say, I am answerable to the American people, and to them alone, for the exercise of this power, in the same manner that the Senate is for the exercise of any power conferred upon them by the Constitution?