the Federal court of that State within whose jurisdiction it is alleged to have been committed. If committed in Maryland, the trial must take place in Baltimore; if in Pennsylvania, at Clarksburg. The distance of one hundred or two hundred miles, which he would be compelled to travel to take his trial, and the expenses which he must necessarily incur, would, in themselves, be a severe punishment for a more aggravated offence. Besides, the people of the neighborhood would be harassed in attending as witnesses at such a great distance from their places of abode. These, and many other inconveniences, which I shall not enumerate, would soon compel Congress to authorize the appointment of justices of the peace, or some other inferior tribunals, along the whole extent of the Cumberland Road. Can any man lay his hand upon his heart and say that, in his conscience, he believes the Federal Constitution ever intended to bestow such powers on Congress? The great divisions of power, distinctly marked in that instrument, are external and internal. The first are conferred upon the General Government—the last, with but few exceptions, and those distinctly defined, remain in possession of the States. It never—never was intended that the vast and mighty machinery of this Government should be introduced into the domestic, the local, the interior concerns of the States, or that it should spend its power in collecting toll at a turnpike gate. I have not been presenting possible cases to the committee. I have confined myself to what must be the necessary effects of the passage of the bill now before us. By what authority is such a tremendous power claimed? That it is not expressly given by the Constitution, is certain. If it exists at all, it must, therefore, be incidental to some express power; and in the language of the Constitution, “be necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution.” From the very nature of incidental power, it cannot transcend the specific power which calls it into existence. The stream cannot flow higher than its fountain. This principle applies, with peculiar force, to the construction of the Constitution. For the purpose of carrying into effect any of its specific powers, it would be absurd to contend that you might exercise another power, greater and more dangerous than that expressly given. The means must be subordinate to the end. Were any other construction to prevail, this Government would no longer be one of limited powers.