Buchanan’s Defence, p. 267 _et seq._ It is now necessary to trace the President’s policy in regard to these Mexican affairs, for the remainder of his term after the commencement of the session of Congress in December, 1859. He saw very clearly that unless active measures should be taken by the Government of the United States to reach a power with which a settlement of all claims and difficulties could be effected, some other nation would undertake to establish a government in Mexico, and the United States would then have to interfere, not only to secure the rights of their citizens, but to assert the principle of the “Monroe Doctrine,” which, according to the long standing American claim, opposes European establishments upon any part of this continent. He had his eye especially at this time upon the Emperor of the French, whose colonizing policy for France was well known, and who, Mr. Buchanan was well informed, was exercising, through his minister, great influence over Miramon. It was morally certain that if our Congress did not give the President the means necessary either to uphold the constitutional government of Juarez, or to compel the government of Miramon to do justice to our citizens, he would be involved in the necessity for counteracting the designs of Louis Napoleon. If this would be an interference with the internal affairs of a foreign nation, contrary to our long avowed policy, was not this an exceptional case? Mexico was our neighbor, with whom our social, commercial and political relations were very close. She had no settled government. Without the friendly aid of some external power, she could have no government that could preserve her internal peace, or fulfill her treaty obligations. She was, as Mr. Buchanan forcibly said, “a wreck upon the ocean, drifting about as she is impelled by different factions.” What power could more safely and appropriately undertake to assist her in establishing a settled government than the great neighboring Republic of the United States, whose people and rulers could have no desire to see her depart from the principles of constitutional and republican institutions? And if the United States had wrongs of their own citizens for which to seek redress and indemnification from the Mexican nation, was that a reason for refusing to do whatever might appropriately be done towards assisting any government which the Mexican people might be disposed to support and acknowledge, to acquire the position and authority of a legitimate representative of the nation? It seemed to President Buchanan that there were but two alternatives: either to march a force into Mexico which would be sufficient to enable the constitutional government to reach the capital and extend its power over the whole republic, or to let things drift in uncertainty until Louis Napoleon should interfere. If the United States would act in concert with the constitutional government, the President believed that their consent