{223} After all, it is easier to vindicate the expediency of continuing the practice, where it has been established by law and usage, than to support the affirmative, when the question is propounded as a general thesis on government. It may fairly be questioned, if Aylmer has refuted the principal arguments of his opponent; and had Knox deemed it prudent to rejoin, he might have exposed the fallacy of his reasoning in different instances. In replying to the argument from the apostolical canon,[321] the archdeacon is not a little puzzled. Distrusting his distinction between the greater office, “the ecclesiastical function,” and the less, “extern policy,” he argues, that the apostle’s prohibition may be considered as temporary, and peculiarly applicable to the women of his own time; and he insists that his clients shall not, _in toto_, be excluded from teaching and ruling in the church, any more than in the state. “Me thinke,” says he, very seriously, “even in this poynte, we must use επιεικια, a certain moderacion, not absolutely, and in every wise to debar them herein (as it shall please God) to serve Christ. Are there not, in England, women, think you, that for their learninge and wisdom, could tell their householde and neighbouris as good a tale as the best Sir Jhone there?”[322] Beyond {224} all question. Who can doubt that the learned Lady Elizabeth, who on a certain time interrupted the dean of her chapel, and told him to “stick to his text,” was able to make as good a sermon as any of her clergy? or, that she was better qualified for other parts of the duty, when she composed a book of prayers for herself, while they were obliged to use one made to their hands? In fact, the view which the archdeacon gave of the text was necessary to vindicate the authority of his queen, who was head, or supreme governor, of the church, as well as of the state. She who, by law, had supreme authority over all the reverend and right reverend divines in the land, with power to superintend, suspend, and control them in all their ecclesiastical functions――who, by her injunctions, could direct the primate himself when to preach, and how to preach――and who could license and silence ministers at her pleasure, must have been bound very moderately indeed by the apostolical prohibition, “I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence.” Reason would also say, that she had an equal right to assume the exercise of the office in her own person, if she chose to avail herself of that right; and had she issued a congé d’élire, accompanied with her royal recommendation to elect some learned sister to a vacant see, the archdeacon at least would not have felt so squeamish at complying with it, as the Italian university did at conferring the degree of Doctor in Divinity upon the learned Helen Lucrecia Piscopia Cornaca.[323]