Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, Volume III.Scott, Walter
History
Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, Volume III.
Scott, Walter
France -- History -- 1789-1815; Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, 1769-1821
About the middle of August, Prussia began to arm. Perhaps there are few
examples of a war declared with the almost unanimous consent of a great
and warlike people, which was brought to an earlier and more unhappy
termination. On the 1st of October, Knobelsdorff, the Prussian envoy,
was called upon by Talleyrand to explain the cause of the martial
attitude assumed by his state. In reply, a paper was delivered,
containing three propositions, or rather demands. First, That the French
troops which had entered the German territory, should instantly recross
the Rhine. Secondly, That France should desist from presenting obstacles
to the formation of a league in the northern part of Germany, to
comprehend all the states, without exception, which had not been
included in the Confederation of the Rhine. Thirdly, That negotiations
should be immediately commenced, for the purpose of detaching the
fortress of Wesel from the French empire, and for the restitution of
three abbeys,[231] which Murat had chosen to seize upon as a part of his
Duchy of Berg. With this manifesto[232] was delivered a long explanatory
letter, containing severe remarks on the system of encroachment which
France had acted upon. Such a text and commentary, considering their
peremptory tone, and the pride and power of him to whom they were
addressed in such unqualified terms, must have been understood to amount
to a declaration of war. And yet, although Prussia, in common with all
Europe, had just reason to complain of the encroachments of France, and
her rapid strides to universal empire, it would appear that the two
first articles in the King's declaration, were subjects rather of
negotiation than grounds of an absolute declaration of war; and that the
fortress of Wesel, and the three abbeys, were scarce of importance
enough to plunge the whole empire into blood for the sake of them.
Prussia, indeed, was less actually aggrieved than she was mortified and
offended. She saw she had been outwitted by Buonaparte in the
negotiation of Vienna; that he was juggling with her in the matter of
Hanover; that she was in danger of beholding Saxony and Hesse withdrawn
from her protection, to be placed under that of France; and under a
general sense of these injuries, though rather apprehended than really
sustained, she hurried to the field. If negotiations could have been
protracted till the advance of the Russian armies, it might have given a
different face to the war; but in the warlike ardour which possessed the
Prussians, they were desirous to secure the advantages which, in
military affairs, belong to the assailants, without weighing the
circumstances which, in their situation, rendered such precipitation
fatal.
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