I do not pretend to give more than an estimate; but I have made the estimate with some care, going to the adjutants of different regiments that had been in as heavy fighting as any--getting statements of their losses, sure to be very nearly if not quite accurate, and approximating thus from the loss of a dozen regiments to the probable loss of all. I have ridden over the grounds, too--have seen the dead and wounded lying over the field--have noted the number in the hospitals and on the boats. As the result of it all, I do not believe our loss in killed and wounded will number over five thousand. The question of prisoners is another matter. The best opinions of the strength with which the Rebels attacked us place their numbers at sixty thousand. They may have been reinforced five to ten thousand Sunday night. Grant had scarcely forty thousand effective men on Sunday. Of these, half a dozen regiments were utterly raw--had scarcely had their guns long enough to know how to handle them. Some were supplied with weapons on their way up. Buell crossed three divisions that took part in the action--Nelson's, Crittenden's, and McCook's. They numbered say twenty thousand--a liberal estimate. Lew. Wallace came up on Monday, with say seven thousand more. That gives us, counting the Sunday men as all effective again, sixty-seven thousand on Monday, on one side, against sixty to seventy thousand Rebels. It was not numbers that gained us the day, it was fighting. All honor to our Northern soldiers for it. CHAPTER XV. CORINTH. HALLECK TAKES THE FIELD--ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY--PROGRESS AT A SNAIL'S PACE--SHERMAN'S ADVANCE--THE FLIGHT OF THE REBELS--SHERMAN'S OFFICIAL REPORT--CONGRATULATING THE TROOPS-- BEAUREGARD'S ADDRESS TO HIS SOLDIERS--SOME ACCOUNT OF CORINTH-- ABRUPT FINALE OF A REBEL HARANGUE. The battle of Pittsburgh Landing unquestionably presented remarkable features. The magnitude of the struggle, the panic that affected some of the troops on the first day, the stern recovery and complete triumph of the second day, all make the event notable in our military annals. But far more remarkable, in an entirely different sense, was the campaign that followed; a campaign that even now can scarcely be contemplated with patience. It seemed as though the commanding General (Halleck), conceding the truth of the charges of excessive rashness and lack of preparation at Shiloh, had now resolved to atone therefore by going to the opposite extreme of caution and deliberation. The results of this policy were not disastrous; but they were exasperating. Had the Union army promptly followed up its advantage, gained at Shiloh, it could and doubtless would have annihilated the opposing forces and made rebellion in that region a thing of the past. This probably would have been done had Sherman been in command; for, as we have seen, his voice was for an aggressive campaign. But Sherman was not in command.