"Defeat would have been our ruin. Our troops, always fighting under cover, had trifling losses when compared with the enemy, whose numerical superiority was thus reduced daily and rapidly. We could, therefore, reasonably expect to cope with him on equal terms by the time that the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on our side of that river would have been his destruction. We, if beaten, had a refuge in Atlanta too strong to be assaulted, too extensive to be invested. I also hoped, by breaking the railroad in his rear, that he might be compelled to attack us in a position of our own choosing, or to a retreat easily converted into a rout. After we crossed the Etowah, five detachments of cavalry were successively sent with instructions to destroy as much as they could of the railroad between Dalton and the Etowah; all failed, because too weak. We could never spare a sufficient body of cavalry for this service, as its assistance was absolutely necessary in the defence of every position we occupied. Early in the campaign the statements of the strength of cavalry in the Departments of Mississippi and East Louisiana given me by Lieutenant-General Polk, just from that command, and my telegraphic correspondence with his successor, led me to hope that a competent force could be sent from Mississippi and Alabama to prevent the use of the railroad by the United States army." The Rebel army was now about 51,000 strong, and was strongly posted at Peach Tree Creek, four miles northwest of Atlanta. The place had been selected by Johnston for a decisive battle, and he had expected that the Union Army, in spreading out to flank him, would weaken its centre so that he could make an effective attack. Exactly this thing occurred, and on the afternoon of July 20th, the Rebel blow was struck. Hood's troops came rushing down the hillside against the Union lines with just such fury as Stonewall Jackson's columns used to display. But they were met by strong resistance, and after a bloody conflict, were driven to their intrenchments. Thus the first of Johnston's plans which Hood tried to execute, failed. The second plan and effort was to withdraw the main army from Peach Tree Creek far to the right, leaving Atlanta almost undefended, and then fall upon Sherman's left flank as his army advanced upon the city.