"Here it will be inquired, What opposition will he encounter, and what is his object? There will be no army in front of him and the Georgia militia will be utterly inefficient in obstructing his progress. Hood is powerless; Lee has no men to spare, and if he had, it would take a large army to encounter Sherman. The field is, therefore, open before him, and the main question is, what can he accomplish? In our opinion, he can accomplish the most important results reached in the war. When a column reaches Macon, it can destroy, effectually, the only remaining railroad communication between the eastern and western parts of the Confederacy. When a column shall reach Augusta, it destroys the largest manufactories and depot of military munitions in the South. The greatest and almost only powder manufactory is there. When the railroad to Augusta, and from Savannah to Charleston are destroyed, there is no further practicable military communication between the country east of the Savannah and west of it. We shall have severed the Confederacy by another impassable line. "But this is only the beginning. If Sherman can reach Beaufort, after a week's rest, he can move right on through North Carolina to Danville, thus making Eastern Virginia a prison and a grave for Lee's army and the Rebel Government. This, we say, is perfectly practicable with an average share of luck. We do not know that General Sherman has all this in his plan; but why not? Why should he not aim at the greatest results? What is to prevent these results? He has a large, well equipped disciplined army. What is there from the Roanoke to the Tennessee to oppose him? Nothing that can oppose any serious resistance to a disciplined army. "But what of Hood? Hood has no larger army than Thomas has, besides all the garrisons, gunboats and militia in the rear. It will be less safe for him to advance than to retreat. Such is the outline of the military operations we suppose to be on foot. We wait further information with solicitude, but with hope that the final will be brilliant and decisive." A private letter from one of Sherman's officers, just before the start from Atlanta, gave this view of the case: "We are under orders to prepare for a _sixty days' campaign_; so you see that does not look much like spending the winter in Atlanta, as many have hoped to do. It is not supposed that any below a Major-General knows what is to be the programme--nor do they; but it is generally conjectured that a large force is soon to start for Savannah, via Augusta and Milledgeville. General Thomas will have force, with what will be left him by Sherman, to 'do the agreeable' to Hood. You may expect that 'something may turn up' before this army settles down for the winter." Among the many accounts of the march to the sea, one of the most graphic and accurate was furnished by an army officer to the New York _Evening Post_. Writing from Atlanta on November 14th, he said: