"By the 1st of November Hood's army had moved from Gadsden, and made its appearance in the neighborhood of Decatur, where a feint was made; he then passed on to Tuscumbia and laid a pontoon bridge opposite Florence. I then began my preparations for the march through Georgia, having received the sanction of the Commander-in-Chief carrying into effect my plan, the details of which were explained to all my corps commanders and heads of staff departments, with strict injunctions of secrecy. I had also communicated full details to General Thomas, and had informed him I would not leave the neighborhood of Kingston until he felt perfectly confident that he was entirely prepared to cope with Hood, should he carry into effect his threatened invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky. I estimated Hood's force at 35,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. "I moved the Army of the Tennessee by slow and easy marches on the south of the Coosa back to the neighborhood of Smyrna camp ground, and the Fourteenth Corps, General Jeff. C. Davis, to Kingston, whither I repaired in person on the 2d of November. From that point I directed all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed for my contemplated march, all the sick and wounded, refugees, &c., to be sent back to Chattanooga; and the four corps above-mentioned, with Kilpatrick's Cavalry, were put in the most efficient condition possible for a long and difficult march. This operation consumed the time until the 11th of November, when, everything being ready, I ordered General Corse, who still remained at Rome, to destroy the bridges there, all foundries, mills, shops, warehouses, or other property that could be useful to an enemy, and to move to Kingston. At the same time the railroad in and about Atlanta, and between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, was ordered to be utterly destroyed. "The garrisons from Kingston northward were also ordered to draw back to Chattanooga, taking with them all public property and all railroad stock, and to take up the rails from Resaca back, saving them, ready to be replaced whenever future interests should demand. The railroad between the Etowah and the Oostanaula was left untouched, because I thought it more than probable we would find it necessary to re-occupy the country as far forward as the Etowah. Atlanta itself is only of strategic value as long as it is a railroad centre; and as all the railroads leading to it are destroyed, as well as all its foundries, machine shops, warehouses, depots, &c., it is of no more value than any other point in North Georgia; whereas the line of the Etowah, by reasons of its rivers and natural features, possesses an importance which will always continue. From it all parts of Georgia and Alabama can be reached by armies marching with trains down the Coosa or the Chattahoochee Valleys.