"Now, there were a good many little prejudices among the soldiers and the armies of the West which the public, at this day, do not appreciate. For instance, there were three grand Western armies--the Army of the Tennessee, Army of the Cumberland and Army of the Ohio. There were unavoidable jealousies between these armies and their commanders. Their respective triumphs and defeats were the subjects of undue taunts, ridicule or criticism. My particular army was that of Tennessee, and it is more than possible, and quite probable, that I have colored things highly in its favor. Doubtless I was much prejudiced in its favor, just as you would be in favor of an old acquaintance as opposed to a comparative stranger. I knew every brigade and regimental commander in this army, and was familiar with the fighting capacity of each corps. I knew exactly what division to hold in reserve, and those to storm a breastwork. Besides I had this army so organized that I had only to give an order and it was executed. No red tape nor circumlocution was necessary. If I wanted one of Buell's corps I had to issue a command, and that had to be repeated, perhaps in writing from corps to division, and from division to brigade and regiment, and thus would take two hours to get a body of troops in motion when time was precious and impetuous action was needed. My army was one of wild fighters, never so well pleased as when driving the enemy before them. Buell had a splendid army, but it was slow and conservative, composed of as brave and stubborn fighters as any other command, and yet not accustomed to brilliant and quick movements. "The attack made on me about the 'political Generals' was unfair. I never used such a term. My sole intention was to mention, in a spirit of fair criticism, certain circumstances that in a measure defeated my efforts to have a constantly efficient army. For instance, we would have a big fight and come out victorious. We would go into camp for an indefinite period, and with no prospect of an early campaign. At such periods I noticed that my subordinate commanders who had previously had political aspirations would strike out for home to see the 'people.' They would make a few speeches, and as the fighting season approached they would rejoin their commands. In the meantime, if I wanted to find out anything about the exact condition of each division, the transportation, or the commissary or quartermaster affairs, I could find no responsible head to give me official information. Such things tended to destroy the discipline, and consequently the efficiency of the army, and it was a matter to which I had good reason to object. I wanted commanders who would stay with their commands, and not those who cherished ambitious political projects, and who were continually running off to see the people at home."