Life's Progress Through the Passions; Or, The Adventures of NaturaHaywood, Eliza Fowler
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Life's Progress Through the Passions; Or, The Adventures of Natura
Haywood, Eliza Fowler
English fiction -- 18th century
What she thought of a behaviour she had so little reason to expect,
and what effect it produced on her future conduct, shall hereafter be
related: I shall only say at present, that Natura gave himself no pain
to consider what might be her sentiments on the occasion, as long as
he found her uncle was perfectly satisfied with his manner of acting
in this point, which he had no reason to doubt of, not only by the
assurances he gave him in words of his being so, but by a more
convincing and substantial proof, which was this; an envoy
extraordinary being about to be sent to a foreign court, on a very
important negociation, he had the honour of being recommended, as a
gentleman every way qualified for the duties of that post.--The
minister's choice of him was approved by the king and council, and he
set out on his embassy, with an equipage and state, which, joined to
the attention he gave to what he was employed in, greatly dissipated
the chagrin of his private affairs, and he seemed to have forgot, for
a time, not only the injuries he had received, but also even the
persons from whom he had received them.
CHAP. II.
Shews at what age men are most liable to the passion of grief: the
impatience of human nature under affliction, and the necessity there
is of exerting reason, to restrain the excesses it would otherwise
occasion.
There are certain periods of time, in which the passions take the
deepest root within us; what at one age makes but a slight impression,
and is easily dissipated by different ideas, at another engrosses all
the faculties, and becomes so much a part of the soul, as to require
the utmost exertion of reason, and all the aids of philosophy and
religion to eradicate.--Grief, for example, is one of those passions
which, in extreme youth, we know little of, and even when we grow
nearer to maturity, has rarely any great dominion, let the cause which
excites it be never so interesting, or justifiable: it may indeed be
poignant for a time, and drive us to all the excesses imputed to that
passion; but then it is of short continuance, it dwells not on the
mind, and the least appearance of a new object of satisfaction,
banishes it entirely; we dry our tears, and remember no more what so
lately we lamented, perhaps with the most noisy exclamations:--but it
is not so when riper years give a solidity and firmness to the
judgment;--then as we are less apt to grieve without a cause, so we
are less able to refrain from grieving, when we have a real
cause.--Grief may therefore be called a reasonable passion, tho' it
becomes not a reasonable man to give way to it;--this, at first sight,
may seem a paradox to many people, but may easily be solved, in my
opinion, on a very little consideration;--as thus,--because to be
sensible of our loss in the value of the thing for which we mourn, is
a proof of our judgment, as to refrain that mourning for what is past
retrieving, within the bounds of moderation, is the greatest proof we
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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