characteristic: that of being the one that suits my wants, that is to say, the one _that pleases me._ But I shall again have to employ those abstract characteristics, in my conversation with the person who sells it to me and in the contract that I make; there I shall speak, not only of my will and pleasure, but also of a house thirty metres high and forty wide, and so on. The same must be said of the squirrels and platyrrhine monkeys, which I cannot contrive to see in a museum or zoological garden, unless I describe them in that way; and I shall continue so to describe them, although those abstract characteristics have no definite value, either in permitting me to describe those animals with accuracy, or in making me understand their meaning in the universe, or in the history of the cosmos. [Sidenote: _Empirical individual judgments and abstract individual judgments._] But in proceeding further to determine the differential characteristics presented by pseudojudgments in contrast with individual judgments, it is necessary to consider them according to the double form, empirical and abstract, assumed by pseudoconcepts, thus distinguishing them as empirical individual judgments and abstract individual judgments. [Sidenote: _Process of formation of empirical judgments._] In comparing empirical individual judgments with pure individual judgments--for example, "The _Transfiguration_ is a sacred picture," an empirical judgment, and "The _Transfiguration_ is an æsthetic work," a pure judgment--the first thing to note is that the empirical individual judgment presupposes the pure individual judgment. We already know that pseudoconcepts, empirical or abstract, presuppose the idea of the pure concept; but that idea does not suffice for the formation of determinate empirical concepts, which can be employed as predicates of empirical judgments. We must not only think effectively these or those pure concepts, but they must be translated into individual judgments. Were this not so, where would empirical concepts obtain their material? Before the judgment: "The _Transfiguration_ is a sacred picture," can be pronounced, we must first have the empirical concept of "sacred picture." Now this empirical concept (setting aside the fact that it presupposes other empirical concepts which we do not here take into account, because they would complicate the problem without aiding the solution that we wish to give) presupposes in its turn the pure concept of "æsthetic work"; and it is only when a certain number, more or less large, of artistic works have been recognized as such, that is, when pure individual judgments concerning them have been formed, that we can abstract the characteristics and pass to the formation of the pseudoconcepts: sacred, historical, mythological pictures, landscapes, and so on. Having obtained these, then, and only then when we stand before an æsthetic work, for example, the _Transfiguration,_