A final observation, suggested by the difference between pure individual judgments (or judgments of reality and value, if it please you so to call them), and quantitative or empirico-abstract judgments, is that the entire conception of things as occupying various portions of _space_ and following one another in a _discontinuous_ manner, _separated_ from one another in _time,_ is derived from the last type of pseudojudgments, namely the quantitative. It is an _alteration_ effected for practical ends from the ingenuous view offered by pure perception. To show, as we have shown, the genesis of quantitative judgments and so of mathematical space and time, amounts to describing their nature and giving their definition. It amounts to revealing them as thoughts of _abstractions,_ which are not to be confounded with real thought, or with genuine thought of reality. The Kantian concept of the _ideality_ of _time_ and _space_ gives the same result. This doctrine is among the greatest discoveries of history, and should be accepted by every philosophy worthy of the name. In accepting it ourselves, we make but one reservation (justified by the proofs given above), namely, that the character of mathematical space and time should be called not ideality (because ideality is true reality), but rather _unreality_ or _abstract ideality,_ or, as we prefer to call it, _abstractness._ THIRD SECTION IDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL _A PRIORI_ SYNTHESIS I IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT [Sidenote: _Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and the individual judgment._]