It follows from these considerations (which could be easily multiplied) that the individual judgment is not less logical than that of definition. Truths of fact, contingent and _a posteriori,_ are not less logical than those of reason, necessary and _a priori._ But if this be so, the distinction between the two forms would not be a distinction between forms of the spirit, but a subdistinction within the logical form of the spirit: a subdistinction of which we have already denied the possibility. For it is not clear how a logical thought, or thought of the universal, can be _two_ thinkings, one in one way, one in another: one universal of the universal, the other universal of the individual. Either the first is void, or the second is improper. Intuition and concept are distinguished as individual from universal; but that universal should be distinguished from universal by the introduction of individuality as element of differentiation is inconceivable. [Sidenote: _Difficulty of abandoning the distinction._] The difficulty becomes greater from the equal inconceivability and impossibility of abandoning the result reached above, by which the individual judgment was shown to be possible only by means of a concept or judgment of definition. Every attempt that may be made to cancel that presupposition and to reconceive the individual or perceptive judgment as preceding the concept and being altogether without logical character, a mere assertion of fact, unenlightened by universality, must be considered, for the reasons we have given, to be entirely vain. If we cannot admit a duality of logical forms, still less can we admit that an alogical character, below the level of logic altogether, attaches to the individual judgment. [Sidenote: _The hypothesis of reciprocal implication and so of the identity of the two forms._]