Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
Instead of noting and of examining all the objections made to the _a
priori_ synthesis (which we have already substantially discussed in
the development of our treatise), it will be of assistance to add some
explanations, which will prevent false interpretations of that concept.
These false interpretations sometimes (as often happens) mingle with
the true even in the philosopher who discovered it, and confer force
and authority upon several of the objections to the very reality of the
_a priori_ synthesis.
[Sidenote: _A priori synthesis in general and logical a priori
synthesis._]
In the first place, in accordance with the formula given in Logic we
must not speak of the _a priori_ synthesis in general, but of the
_logical a priori synthesis._ The _a priori_ synthesis belongs to all
the forms of the Spirit; indeed, the Spirit, considered universally,
is nothing but _a priori_ synthesis. The synthesis is operative in the
æsthetic activity, not less than in the logical. For how could a poet
create a pure intuition, if he did not proceed from a given fact, from
some passionate moment of his own, conditioned and constituted in a
particular way? Without something to intuite and to express could there
ever be a poet? And would he be a poet, if he were to repeat that
something mechanically, without transforming it into pure intuition?
In his pure intuition, there is and there is not matter: not as brute
matter, but as formed matter, or form. Thus it is said with reason
that art is pure form, or that matter and form, content and form, in
art are wholly one (_a priori_ æsthetic synthesis). The _a priori_
synthesis is not less operative in the practical activity than in
the æsthetic and logical (that is, in the theoretic activity). It is
impossible to will without material to will, or to will outside the
given material. The practical man accepts actual conditions, and at the
same time transforms them with his volitional act, creating something
new, in which those conditions are and are not. They are, because
the action achieved is in relation to them; they are not, because
being new, it has transformed them. _A priori_ synthesis, in general,
then, means spiritual activity; not abstract but concrete spiritual
activity, that is to say, the spirit itself, which is _condition_ to
itself and _conditioned_ by itself. Thus the _a priori_ synthesis,
which is constituted by the coincidence or identity of the judgment of
definition with the individual judgment, is not _a priori_ synthesis in
general, but logical _a priori_ synthesis.
[Sidenote: _Non-logical a priori syntheses._]
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