the totality of the categories was not understood and was abandoned at a later date, and a return was made in some sort to the categories of the theoretic and practical--theoretic spirit alone--(von Hartmann gives them in his fundamental tripartition of the categories into sensibility, reflective thought and speculative thought). But the tendency to totality reappeared, in an elementary form, in Stuart Mill, who opposed to the Aristotelian table his own, divided into the three classes of _sentiments_ (sensations, thoughts, emotions, volitions), of _substances_ (bodies and spirits), and of _attributes_ (quality, relation, quantity): a vertiginous regression to an infantile conception, which yet sought to embrace in its own way the whole of reality. [Sidenote: _The logical order of the predicates or categories._] The doctrine of the categories has been introduced and retained in Logic, not only because of the confusion between the thought of thought and thought in general, which has just been explained, but also because of another confusion, which must now be explained, as it has far deeper roots and far greater importance. It has been and may be argued in this way. It is true that the categories are nothing but simply the concepts of reality; but these concepts, acting as predicates, are presented in logic in a necessary order, which it is the task of logical Science to deduce. In determining reality by means of thought, we begin with a first predicate, for instance _being,_ judging that reality is. This judgment immediately shows itself insufficient, whence it becomes necessary to determine it with a second predicate and to judge that reality both is and is not, or is _becoming._ This predicate of becoming appears in its turn vague and abstract, and it becomes necessary to determine reality as _quality,_ then as _quantity, measure, essence, existence, mechanism, teleology, life, reflexion, will, idea,_ in short with all the predicates that exhaust the concept of reality. [Sidenote: _Illusion as to the logical reality of this order._] But we know that this order, this supposed succession, is illusory and is simply the product of abstract analysis. In the predicate to which verbal prominence is given, there is concentrated or understood every predicate, because in every judgment complete reality[2] is predicated of the subject. Moreover this is shown just by the observation, which reveals the insufficiency of an isolated and abstract predicate, and requires for sufficiency nothing less than the totality of the predicates, the full concept of the Real, of the Spirit or of the Idea. The concept of Reality, of Spirit or the Idea, can without doubt be developed, in its unity and in its distinctions; but (let us yet again repeat) logical Science has for its object, not the effective unity and distinction of the Real, but the _concept_ of unity and distinction..