Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
If the confusion between Logic and the Doctrine of the Categories, or
between the thinking of the logical category and the thinking of the
other categories, had produced no other effect than that of introducing
into books of Logic a method of treatment that exceeds their bounds,
the evil would not be great. It would chiefly affect literary harmony
and clarity of didactic exposition. But from that confusion there has
sometimes as _rational Philosophy and real Philosophy,_ sometimes as
_Gnoseology and Anthropology (or Cosmology,)_ sometimes as _Logic and
System of Philosophy,_ and so on. The conception of Reality is thus
twice described: once as part of Logic (the Doctrine of the Categories,
Ontology, etc.); and again as effective or applied Philosophy.
Philosophy is divided into a Prologue to Philosophy and Philosophy,
or into Philosophy and a Conclusion to Philosophy. But Philosophy,
although it is distinguishable into philosophies (for example,
Æsthetic, Logic, Economic and Ethic), _is this distinction itself,_
or the unity immanent in it. It never gives rise to a duality of
grades. It is never prologue, development and conclusion, being, at its
every point, prologue, development and conclusion. As from empirical
and formalist Logic arose the idea of a Logic which should not be
philosophy, but an organ or instrument or rule or law for the rest of
philosophy; so from the confusion of Logic with the Doctrine of the
Categories has arisen the idea of a Logic, or Metaphysic, or general
Philosophy, or whatever else it may be called, which should be _opposed
to or above_ the rest of philosophy. But the Science of thought, Logic,
is at once thought and effective philosophy; it is thought itself
which in thinking the Real, thinks itself and places itself, as logical
Science, in the place which belongs to it in the system of the Real.
[Sidenote: _Philosophy and pure logic: overcoming of the duality._]
It may seem that in this way thought and reality are again divided and
a metaphysical dualism created. But the exact opposite is the truth.
When Philosophy is distinguished into general and particular, into
rational and real, into pure and applied, into Logic-metaphysic and
into Philosophy of nature and of man, an irreparable breach is made,
which can only be concealed or attenuated in a more or less ingenious
manner. But when that doubleness of degree is destroyed (and thought
thinking the real thereby thinks itself), and in the construction of
Philosophy, the Philosophy of philosophy, namely Logic, is constructed,
the dualism is for ever overcome. This thought is the thinking of the
distinctions, which the real presents; but to think distinctions and to
think unity is, as has been already demonstrated, the same thing.
[Footnote 1: _Logik,_ pp. 532-3.]
[Footnote 2: See above Sect. II. Chap. V.]
SECOND PART
PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES
I
THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE
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