Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
All the definitions that have ever been given of philosophy will be
found to contain the thought that philosophy is the pure concept
(or to say the same thing with more words and less precision), that
it has the pure concept as its directive criterion. All, be it well
understood, save those which, in negating the pure concept, negate also
the peculiar nature of philosophy. But such are not, properly speaking,
definitions of philosophy, although even these, by contradicting
themselves, imply and assume the definition of philosophy as an
original form, and so as the pure concept. Such is the case with the
theories already examined, of æstheticism, mysticism, and empiricism
(and also of mathematicism), to which we shall return. For them,
philosophy is art, sentiment, the empirical (or abstract) concept.
But it is an art in some way differentiated from the rest of art, a
sentiment that acquires a peculiar value, an empirical or abstract
concept, which raises itself up and looks over the heads of the others.
Thus it is something peculiar, a mode of reflecting _sui generis,_
and so precisely the pure concept. Empiricism especially reveals this
intimate contradiction, when it advocates a philosophy consisting of a
systematization or synthesis of the results of the empirical sciences.
That is to say, it advocates something not given by the empirical
sciences, because, were they to give it, they would already be
systematized and synthesized of themselves, and the further elaboration
asked for would be altogether superfluous.
[Sidenote: _Those that define it as the science of supreme principles,
ultimate causes, etc.; contemplation of death, etc.;_]
All the other definitions which presuppose the peculiarity of
philosophy are reducible, as is easily seen, to the single character of
the pure concept. Philosophy (they say) is the science of the _supreme
principles of the real,_ the science of _ultimate causes,_ of the
_origin of things,_ and the like. In these propositions, the supreme
principles are evidently not real things, or groups of real things, or
empty formulæ, but the ideal generators of the real. Ultimate causes
are not causes (for the cause is never ultimate, being always the
effect of an antecedent cause), but ideal principles. The origin in
question is not the historical origin of this or that single fact, but
the ideal deduction of the fact from facts or from omnipresent reality.
The same idea is expressed in the imaginative saying that philosophy is
the _contemplation of death._ For what but the individual dies? And is
not the contemplation of the death of the individual also that of the
immortality of the universal? Is it not contemplation of the eternal?
This remark supplies the motive for that other formula which defines
philosophy as "the vision of things _sub specie aeterni._"
[Sidenote: _as elaboration of the concepts, criticism, science of
norms;_]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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