The distinction between nature and spirit being therefore, in this last sense, altogether empirical, it is clear that the natural sciences (in the gnoseological or gnoseopractical sense in which we give chem this name) are not restricted to the development of knowledge relating to what is called inferior reality, from the animal downwards, leaving to the sciences of the spirit the knowledge that relates to superior reality from the animal upwards, that is to say, to man. Sciences of nature and sciences of the spirit, _orbis naturalis_ and _orbis intellectuals,_ are also, in this case, partitions and convenient groupings. All do substantially the same thing, that is to say, they provide one single homogeneous practical treatment of knowledge. [Sidenote: _Demand for such an extension, and effective existence of what is demanded._] On this unity and homogeneity is based the demand so often made (especially in the second half of the nineteenth century) for the extension of _the method of the natural sciences_ to the sciences of the spirit or moral sciences, the _orbis intellectualis,_ for a naturalistic treatment of the productions of language and of art, or of political, social, and religious life. Thus were originated or prophesied a Psychology, an Æsthetic, an Ethic, a Sociology, _methodo naturali demonstratae._ It was necessary to draw the attention of those makers of programmes and advisers (apart from the evil philosophic intentions, positivist or materialistic, which they nourished in their bosoms) to the superfluity of their demand, and gently to reprove them with the old phrase: _Quod petis in manu habes._ Since man was man and constructed pseudoconcepts and empirical sciences, these naturalistic classifications have never been limited to animals, plants, and minerals, nor to physical, chemical, and biological phenomena, but have been extended to all the manifestations of reality. Naturalistic Logic, Psychology, Linguistic Sociology and Ethics have not awaited the nineteenth century ere they should open to the sun. And (without going too far back in time, or leaving Europe) they already bore flower and fruit in the Sociology (Politics) of Aristotle, in the Grammatics of the Alexandrians, in the Poetics and Rhetoric of Aristotle himself, or of Hermagoras, of Cicero, or of Quintilian, and so on. The novelty of the nineteenth century has principally consisted in giving the names _social Physics,_ or the _physico-acoustic science of language_ to what was once more simply, and perhaps in better taste, called otherwise. But in saying this we do not wish to deny that certain naturalistic work has been far more copious in the nineteenth century than in Greece, and that naturalistic methods have not been applied with singular acumen and exactitude in those fields of study. Linguistic affords a case in point, with _its phonetic laws,_ by reason of which it moves so proudly among its companions.