Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
There is a form of scepticism which would like to appear critical and
refined and which takes the name of _agnosticism._ It is a scepticism
limited to ultimate things, to profound reality, to the essence of
the world, which amounts to saying that it is limited to the supreme
principles of philosophy. Now, since the principles of philosophy are
all equally supreme, such agnostic scepticism extends its affirmation
of mystery over neither more nor less than the whole of philosophy and
consequently over the whole of human knowledge. Its limits would be
nothing less than the boundaries of knowledge. Indeed, agnosticism is
the spiritual fulfilment sought by all those who negate philosophy,
such as æstheticists, mathematicians, and especially empiricists; and
agnostics and empiricists are ordinarily so closely connected that the
one name is almost synonymous with the other.
[Sidenote: _Mysticism._]
The sceptical error, which consists in stating the problem as solution
and mystery as truth, can give way to another mode of error, in which
the very affirmation of scepticism is denied and it is recognized
that thought cannot explicitly state mystery. But this recognition,
which would imply that of the authority of thought, is strangely
combined with the most precise negation of such authority. Thought
being excluded, either affirmatively or negatively, as in the
self-contradiction of scepticism, what remains is life, no longer
a problem, or a solution of a problem, but just life, life lived.
To affirm that truth is life lived, reality directly felt in us as
part of us and we part of it, is the pretension of _mysticism._
This is the last general form of error that can be thought; and its
self-contradiction is evident from the genetic process which we have
already expounded. Mysticism affirms, when no affirmation is permitted
to it; and it is yet more gravely contradictory than scepticism, which,
though forbidding to itself logical affirmation, does not forbid
itself speech, that is to say, æsthetic expression. To mysticism not
even words can be permissible, because mysticism, being life and not
contemplation, practice and not theory, is by definition _dumbness._
But we shall say no more of mysticism, having had occasion to refer to
it, as also to æstheticism and empiricism, at the beginning of this
treatise on Logic.
[Sidenote: _Errors in the other parts of philosophy._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account