Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
The surpassing of the Logic of the abstract concept and the achievement
of that of the concrete concept or pure concept or idea, was realized
in other ways, primarily by a sort of reduction to the absurd of
empiricist and mathematical Logic, in the scepticism which was its
result. This reduction to the absurd, this final scepticism, is to
be observed in the movement of English philosophy, beginning with
Locke or even with Hobbes, to Hume. Locke, starting from perception
as his presupposition, derived all ideas from experience, with the
sole instrument of reflection; and rejecting innate ideas and looking
upon others as more or less arbitrary, he preserved some objectivity
to mathematical ideas alone, which relate to what are called primary
qualities. Berkeley denies objectivity even to the primary qualities.
All concepts, naturalist and mathematical alike, are for him abstract
concepts and to that extent without truth. The only truth is the
"idea," which means here nothing but sensation or the representation
of the individual. His Logic is not empiricist, because it is in no
respect Logic. At the most it is an Æsthetic substituted for and
given as Logic. It is true, notwithstanding his complete denial of
universals--of empirical and abstract, no less than of philosophic,
which he never even mentions--that he deludes himself into thinking
that he has overcome scepticism; and it is true also that he laid the
foundations of a spiritualist and voluntarist conception of reality,
which in our opinion should be preserved and adopted by modern thought.
But this proves only that his philosophy does not wholly agree with
his Logic, and not that his Logic is not the complete denial of the
concept and of thought. The logical consequence of Berkeley could not,
then, be anything but the scepticism of David Hume, who shakes the very
foundation upon which the whole of the science of nature rests, namely,
the principle of causality.
[Sidenote: _Exact science and Kant. The concept of the category._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account