Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
Other disputes, far enough apart in significance and nature, concerning
the nature of the concept, acquire a more precise meaning when
referred to our subdivision of pseudoconcepts into _empirical_ or
_representative,_ and _abstract._ Thereby we can understand why it
has been asked if the concepts are _concrete_ or _abstract, general_
or _universal, contingent_ or _necessary, approximate_ or _rigorous;_
if they are obtained _a posteriori_ or _a priori,_ by _induction_ or
_deduction,_ by _synthesis_ or _analysis,_ and so on. This series
of disputes likewise cannot be settled, save by admitting that both
contending parties are right and wrong, and demonstrating that
pseudoconcepts (which are alone here in discussion) are constructed
by analysis, and by deduction are _a priori,_ and have the characters
of abstractness, rigorousness, universality and necessity, if it be
a question of _abstract_ pseudoconcepts, that is to say, of empty
fictions, outside experience; while, on the other hand, they are
constructed by synthesis, and by induction are _a posteriori,_ and have
the characters of concreteness, approximation, mere generality and
contingency, if they be empirical or _representative_ pseudoconcepts,
that is to say, groups of representations, which do not go beyond
representation and experience. Indeed, from this last point of view, no
error was made in denying any difference between the (representative)
_concept_ and the _general representation._ It is false that this
latter is the result of psychical mechanism or association, and the
former of psychical purpose, because there is nothing mechanical in
the spirit; and the general representation, if it is a product of the
spirit, is as teleological as the other, indeed is absolutely one with
the other. It obeys, like it, the law of _economy,_ or, as we have
shown, the practical ends of convenience and utility.
[Sidenote: _Crossing of the various disputes._]
But these last disputes have crossed with that which we first examined
between realism and nominalism, and have sometimes taken on the same
meaning. This must be kept in mind, to serve as a guide in the dense
forest. Is the concept _a priori_ or _a posteriori,_ universal or
general, necessary or contingent? These questions and others like them
were sometimes understood as equivalent to the question: is it real or
nominal, truth or fiction?
[Sidenote: _Other logical disputes._]
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