Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
Certain problems of Logic, not yet solved in a satisfactory manner,
arise from the failure to make clear the confusion between concepts
and pseudoconcepts, and between empirical and abstract concepts.
Is it or is it not true that every concept must have an individual
representation, taken from its own sphere, as a necessary _support_?
Are concepts of _things_ possible, or is there a special concept
corresponding to every thing? Is a concept of the _individual_
possible? These three questions may be answered in the affirmative, in
the negative, and in the affirmative-negative, according as they are
referred to the empirical concept, the abstract concept, or the pure
concept.
[Sidenote: _The representative accompaniment of the concept._]
For, if we consider the first question, we must resolutely deny that
the abstract concept has any need of a particular representation as its
necessary support. The geometric triangle, as such, is neither white
nor black, nor of any given size; if the representation of a particular
triangle unites itself to it, geometry discards it. But we must just
as resolutely affirm than an empirical or representative concept has
always an image to support it; the concept of a cat needs the image of
a cat, and every book on zoology is accompanied with illustrations.
The image may be varied, but never suppressed; and it may be varied
only within certain limits, because, if these be exceeded, the concept
itself loses its form and is dissipated. Thus, for the concept of the
cat, we could frame a representation of a white or black or red cat, or
a small or big one; but if scarlet colour or the size of an elephant
be attributed to the cat, which serves as symbol of the fiction, the
concept must be changed. That concept has at its command the images
of cats, upon which it has been formed, which, as we know, are always
finite in number. Finally, with reference to the pure concept, it must
be said that every image and no image is in turn a symbol of it; as
every blade of grass (as Vanini said) represents God, and a number of
images, however great it be, does not suffice to represent Him.
[Sidenote: _The concept of the thing and the concept of the
individual._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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