Certainly _distinct_ concepts can become _simple abstractions_; but this only happens when they are taken in an abstract way, and so separated from one another, co-ordinated and made parallel, by means of an arbitrary operation, which can be applied even to the pure concepts. The distinct concepts then become changed into _pseudoconcepts,_ and the character of abstraction belongs to these last, not to the distinct concepts as such, which are always at once distinct and united. [Sidenote: _Other usual distinctions of the concept, and their meaning, identicals, disparates, primitives, and derivatives, etc._] This is not the place to dwell upon the other forms of concepts met with in Logic, known as _identical_ concepts, which cannot be anything but synonyms, or words;--or upon _disparate_ concepts, which are simply distinct concepts, in so far as they are taken in a relation, which is not that given in the distinction, and is therefore arbitrary, so that the concepts, thus presented without the necessary intermediaries, appear disparate;--or _primitive and derived concepts, or simple and compound concepts_; a distinction which does not exist for the pure concepts, since they are always simple and primitive, never compound or derived. [Sidenote: _Universals, particulars, and singulars. Intension and extension._] But the distinction of concepts into _universal, particular,_ and _singular_ deserves elucidation, for the reason that we are now giving. Concepts, which are only universal, or only particular, or only singular, or to which any one of these determinations is wanting, are not conceivable. Indeed, universality only means that the distinct concept is also the unique concept, of which it is a distinction and which is composed of such distinctions; particularity means that the distinct concept is in a determinate! relation with another distinct concept; and singularity that in this particularity and in that universality it is also itself. Thus the distinct concept is always singular, and therefore universal and particular; and the universal concept would be abstract were it not also particular and singular. In every concept there is the whole concept, and all other concepts; but there is also one determinate concept. For example, beauty is spirit (universality), theoretic spirit (particularity), and intuitive spirit (singularity); that is to say, the whole spirit, in so far as it is intuition. Owing to this distinction into universal, particular, and singular, it is self-evident that intension and extension are, as the phrase is, in inverse ratio, since this amounts to repeating that the universal is universal, the particular particular, and the singular singular. [Sidenote: _Logical definition._]