Naturally, all that has been said as to the definition and the syllogism has reference to the true and proper concept, or the pure concept. In the case of pseudoconcepts, where practical motives enter, definition is a simple _command_ (a nominalist definition), and demonstration has no place, save for those of its elements that are derived from the pure concept: _given_ the definitions, the reasoning must logically proceed in a determinate manner. In pseudoconcepts, then, definitions are separate from demonstrations: the first do not spring from the second and are not all one with them; the second presuppose the first and do not produce them. Of these definitions infinite demonstrations are possible, precisely because in reality none is possible, for the definitions themselves are infinite; and when a demonstration is given, this is done only _pro forma_; it is a deception, to conceal a practical convenience, or rather a logical reasoning employed to make it clear. It is for this reason also that the definitions employed in those demonstrations seem to be obtained by means of an act of _faith_ in the irrational; and here faith signifies, not the confidence of thought in itself, but the making a virtue of necessity, accepting as true what is not known as such.--For the rest, pseudoconcepts and concepts have the same relation with the verbal form; that is to say, all are expressed in the most various ways, and there is no obligatory form of language, which can be called the literary form of logical character. The style of the _Civil Code,_ which aroused the admiration of Stendhal, is not the eternal style of laws, for laws were once even put into verse; as in like barbaric times the sciences used to be put into verse. In the life of the word, concepts and pseudoconcepts rush forward in such a way that it is vain to seek there for distinction among them. [Footnote 1: Mentioned in Hegel, _Wiss. d. Logik 2,_ iii. 370 _n._] III CRITIQUE OF FORMALIST LOGIC [Sidenote: _Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic._] From the fact that in the verbal form all distinctions (pure concepts, and empirical and abstract concepts, distinct concepts and opposite concepts) are indistinguishable, and on the other hand all identities, such as that of concept, definition and demonstration, appear differentiated or capable of differentiation, we can deduce the impossibility of constructing logical Science by means of an analysis of the verbal form. The condemnation of all _formal_ Logic is thus pronounced. [Sidenote: _Its nature._]