But precisely because perception is the completion of knowledge, it must be placed not at the beginning, but at the end of cognitive life. To place it at the beginning, as mere sensibility, and to derive from it the concepts, either as the effect of psychological mechanism, or by an arbitrary act of will, is the error of sensationalists and empiricists. To conceive it as judgment, and nevertheless to place it at the beginning, and to deduce from it the concepts by further elaboration, is the error of rationalists and intellectualists. Against these, it must be firmly maintained that the first moment of knowledge is _intuitive_ and not perceptive; and that the concepts do _not originate_ from the intellectual act of perception, but enter the act itself as _constituents._ To begin with perception, understood as perceptive judgment, is to begin at the end, that is to say, with the most highly complex. Perception is thus the sole problem of gnoseology; but only because it is the whole problem, which contains in itself all the others. And it also is, if you like, the _first_ form of the cognitive spirit, but not because it is the most simple, but precisely because it is the _last_; and the last, being also the whole, can also in an absolute sense be called first. [Sidenote: _Origin of this error._] Certainly, the misunderstanding of the sensationalists and the opposing error of the rationalists contain an element of truth, since both are really concepts, which are developed from perception and presuppose it. But, on the other hand, they are not true and proper concepts, but pseudoconcepts, as we have already defined them, and these, being developed from perception, give rise, in their turn, to pseudojudgments. We shall treat of this further on; and thereby explain the genesis of the misunderstanding, that is to say, the erroneous theory will be overcome as misunderstanding and determined as truth. In this difference between individual judgments and individual pseudojudgments, between perceptions and pseudoperceptions, will also clearly be found another of the motives (and perhaps the most profound), which have divided judgments into judgments of fact and judgments of value. [Sidenote: _Individual syllogisms._]