Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
is a proposition which possesses the "is," but in this case it has
merely the value of a sign, not of an act of thought, for that phrase
of old Horace is nothing but the expression of a hortatory motion.
The word, too, can be suppressed, but we do not thereby suppress the
act of thought. The exclamation "beautiful!" uttered before a picture
may be an individual judgment, having as subject the representation
of the picture, and as predicate the æsthetic universal, which is
called beautiful, in which the copula (and here, also, the subject) is
verbally understood, but logically existent, and therefore always also
capable of verbal reintegration. On the other hand, this reintegration
cannot be effected when it is a case of a mere representation or an
expression of a state of the soul; because, in that case, there would
be, not a reintegration, but an integration, that is to say, it would
carry out that act of thought, and produce that individual judgment
which was not present before.
[Sidenote: _Questions concerning propositions without subject.
Verbalism._]
Thus, in asking a last question concerning the individual judgment,
that is to say, whether it be always _existential,_ we must, as always,
transfer the enquiry from verbal to logical analysis, and not waste
time with speculations as to words or fragments of propositions,
arbitrarily torn from their context, and therefore insignificant and
equivocal. The dispute has been most keen in relation to what are
called propositions without a subject, such as "It rains" and the
like. But, although we do not intend to negate the results, obtained
or obtainable from these disputes, we cannot accept the position which
they imply and which renders it possible to agitate and to discuss the
problem to infinity and therefore makes it insoluble. "It is raining"
said with a smile of satisfaction means: "Thank heaven, it is raining";
with a feeling of disappointment: "Bother the rain for preventing my
taking a walk"; in reply to some one asking what is the noise audible
on the window-panes: "The audible sound is the sound of rain"; to
contradict some one who says the weather is fine: "You are stating a
falsehood and have not given yourself the trouble of observing; it is
raining"; or it is the correction of an historical error. And so on.
It is therefore waste of breath to dispute as to the logical nature of
that proposition if its precise signification be not determined; and
when it is truly determined (for the propositions we have substituted,
taken abstractly, can also appear to have many senses and give rise
to misunderstandings), we have quite abandoned the materiality of
verbalism and passed to the thinking of spiritual acts, taken in
themselves.
[Sidenote: _Confusion between different forms of judgments with
relation to existentiality._]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account