Certainly relative non-existence, and the whole content of the concept of existence in general, would require more minute analysis; from which it would perhaps be seen that the so-called non-existent resolves itself into certain categories of practical facts; and thus designates sometimes _arbitrary constructions,_ made by combining images for amusement or with some other intention; sometimes, on the contrary, the _desires,_ which accompany every volitional act and are the infinite _possibilities_ of the real. And it would also be seen that non-existence in the second sense, or the desires, which have been represented by art, are not in its circle in any way distinguished from effective volitions and actions; since, in order to distinguish them, it would be necessary that art should possess a philosophy of the will, however summary, whereas art is without any philosophy. This examination would lead us, however, not only outside the problem now before us, but also outside Logic, to another part of Philosophy,[1] which, although closely related to Logic (as Logic to it), must be the object of special treatment if we do not wish to produce mental confusion by offering everything at once. This was the defect, for example, of G. B. Vico, who put all books into one book, the whole book into a chapter, and frequently his whole philosophy and history into a page or a period. The present writer, though proud to call himself a Vichian, does not propose to imitate the didactic obtuseness of that man of genius. Suffice it to have made clear, as concerns the problem which now occupies us, that every individual judgment implies the existence of what is spoken of, or of the fact given in the representation, even when this fact consists of an act of imagination, that this act may be recognized as such and as such existentialized. It assumes a concept of reality, which divides into effective reality and possible reality, into existence and non-existence, or mere representability. Some modern investigators of what is called the _theory of values_ (students who fluctuate between psychology and philosophy, and between an antiquated philosophy and one that has the future before it) have maintained that a judgment of value cannot be pronounced when we are not dealing with an existing thing. Since for us a judgment of value is equivalent to any individual judgment, we must accept their thesis; freeing it from the embarrassment in which it finds itself in regard to _unreal images_ (which yet give rise, as they themselves confess, to such judgments of value as the æsthetic) by observing that in that case there is the _effectuality,_ the _reality,_ or, in short, the _existence_ of images, which have the _ineffectual_ or _non-existent_ as their content. [Sidenote: _The character of existence as predicate._]