Then A is the cause or a condition of _p_. For, in the first instance, A being introduced (without further change), _p_ arises (Prop. I. (a)); and, in the second instance, A having been removed (without other change), _p_ disappears (Prop. I. (b)). Similarly we may prove, by the same instances, that _p_ is the effect of A. The order of the phenomena and the immediacy of their connection is a matter for observation, aided by whatever instruments and methods of inspection and measurement may be available. As to the invariability of the connection, it may of course be tested by collecting more instances or making more experiments; but it has been maintained, that a single perfect experiment according to this method is sufficient to prove causation, and therefore implies invariability (since causation is uniform), though no other instances should ever be obtainable; because it establishes once for all the unconditionality of the connection A B C _p q r_. Now, formally this is true; but in any actual investigation how shall we decide what is a satisfactory or perfect experiment? Such an experiment requires that in the negative instance B C _q r_, BC shall be the least assemblage of conditions necessary to co-operate with A in producing _p_; and that it is so cannot be ascertained without either general prior knowledge of the nature of the case or special experiments for the purpose. So that invariability will not really be inferred from a single experiment; besides that every prudent inquirer repeats his experiments, if only to guard against his own liability to error. The supposed plurality of causes does not affect the method of Difference. In the above symbolic case, A is clearly _one_ cause (or condition) of _p_, whatever other causes may be possible; whereas with the Single Method of Agreement, it remained doubtful (admitting a plurality of causes) whether A, in spite of being always present with _p_, was ever a cause or condition of it. This method of Difference without our being distinctly aware of it, is oftener than any other the basis of ordinary judgments. That the sun gives light and heat, that food nourishes and fire burns, that a stone breaks a window or kills a bird, that the turning of a tap permits or checks the flow of water or of gas, and thousands of other propositions are known to be true by rough but often emphatic applications of this method in common experience.