"Induction, then, and the Inductive Syllogism, consists in syllogising one extreme with the middle through the other extreme. For example, if B is middle to A and C, to prove through C that A belongs to B."[1] This may be interpreted as follows: Suppose a general proposition is in dispute, and that you wish to make it good by obtaining severally the admission of all the particulars that it sums up. The type of a general proposition in Syllogistic terminology is the Major Premiss, All M is P. What is the type of the particulars that it sums up? Obviously, the Conclusion, S is P. This particular is contained in the Major Premiss, All M is P; its truth is accepted as contained in the truth of All M is P. S is one of the parts of the generic whole M; one of the individuals or species contained in the class M. If you wish, then, to establish P of All M by Induction, you must establish P of all the parts, species, or individuals contained in M, that is, of all possible S_s:_ you must make good that this, that and the other S is P, and also that this, that and the other S constitute the whole of M. You are then entitled to conclude that All M is P: you have syllogised one Extreme with the Middle through the other Extreme. The formal statement of these premisses and conclusion is the Inductive Syllogism. This, that and the other S is P, _Major_. This, that and the other S is all M, _Minor_. [.'.] All M is P, _Conclusion_. This, that and the other magnet (_i.e._, magnets individually) attract iron. This, that and the other magnet (_i.e._, the individuals separately admitted) are all magnets. [.'.] All magnets attract iron. This, that and the other S being simply convertible with All M, you have only to make this conversion and you have a syllogism in Barbara where this, that and the other S figures as the Middle Term. The practical value of this tortuous expression is not obvious. Mediaeval logicians shortened it into what was known as the Inductive Enthymeme: "This, that and the other, therefore all," an obvious conclusion when this, that and the other constitute all. It is merely an evidence of the great master's intoxication with his grand invention. It is a proof also that Aristotle really looked at Induction from the point of view of Interrogative Dialectic. His question was, When is a Respondent bound to admit a general conclusion? And his answer was, When he has admitted a certain number of particulars, and cannot deny that those particulars constitute the whole whose predicate is in dispute. He was not concerned primarily with the analysis of the steps of an inquirer generalising from Nature. [Footnote 1: [Greek: epagoge men oun esti kai ho ex epagoges syllogismos to dia tou eterou thateron akron to meso syllogisasthai; Oion ei ton A G meson to B, dia tou G deixai to A to B hyparchon.] (An. Prior., ii. 23.)] BOOK II.