Lombard Street: A Description of the Money MarketBagehot, Walter
History
Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market
Bagehot, Walter
Banks and banking -- England -- London; Banks and banking -- Great Britain; Finance -- England -- London; Finance -- Great Britain
shallow person in authority, if he be a man of gravity and method,
as such men often are, may do infinite evil in no long time, and
before he is detected. If he is lucky enough to begin at a time of
expansion in trade, he is nearly sure not to be found out till the
time of contraction has arrived, and then very large figures will be
required to reckon the evil he has done.
And thirdly, I fear that the possession of such patronage would ruin
any set of persons in whose gift it was. The election of the
Chairman must be placed either in the court of proprietors or that
of the directors. If the proprietors choose, there will be something
like the evils of an American presidential election. Bank stock will
be bought in order to confer the qualification of voting at the
election of the 'chief of the City.' The Chairman, when elected, may
well find that his most active supporters are large borrowers of the
Bank, and he may well be puzzled to decide between his duty to the
Bank and his gratitude to those who chose him. Probably, if he be a
cautious man of average ability, he will combine both evils; he will
not lend so much money as he is asked for, and so will offend his
own supporters; but will lend some which will be lost, and so the
profits of the Bank will be reduced. A large body of Bank
proprietors would make but a bad elective body for an office of
great prestige; they would not commonly choose a good person, and
the person they did choose would be bound by promises that would
make him less good.
The court of directors would choose better; a small body of men of
business would not easily be persuaded to choose an extremely unfit
man. But they would not often choose an extremely good man. The
really best man would probably not be so rich as the majority of the
directors, nor of so much standing, and not unnaturally they would
much dislike to elevate to the headship of the City, one who was
much less in the estimation of the City than themselves. And they
would be canvassed in every way and on every side to appoint a man
of mercantile dignity or mercantile influence. Many people of the
greatest prestige and rank in the City would covet so great a
dignity; if not for themselves, at least for some friend, or some
relative, and so the directors would be set upon from every side.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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