The aspirations of the livery were (at least for a time) damped by the decision given a few weeks later in a case known as "Plumbe's case." It will be remembered that in 1770 certain livery companies had objected to the tone of a recent remonstrance, and had in consequence passed resolutions forbidding their members to attend Common Halls except for the purpose of elections. A joint committee of the livery and the Common Council had thereupon been appointed to take counsel's opinion upon the rights of the livery.[357] Among the counsel consulted on the question was Glynn, and he and his brethren had given it as their opinion (June, 1771) that the mayor for the time being might legally summon a Common Hall; that it was the duty of those livery companies to whom precepts were sent by the mayor to execute those precepts, and that a wilful refusal was punishable by disfranchisement, the procedure being by way of information filed by the common sergeant in the mayor's court. Informations had accordingly been filed against the masters or wardens of the several companies of Goldsmiths, Weavers and Grocers by order of Common Hall,[358] but only one, viz., that against Alderman Plumbe, of the Goldsmiths, was proceeded with. The question was tried before a jury on the 14th July of this year (1773) with the result that Plumbe was convicted and adjudged to be disfranchised.[359] [Sidenote: Counsel's opinion on the powers of Common Hall.] The powers of the livery were further defined in a legal opinion delivered about this time by the Recorder and Common Sergeant on the questions (1) Whether the lord mayor, aldermen and livery of London in Common Hall assembled could do any corporate act except under the powers given them by Acts of Parliament; (2) Whether an order of the livery in Common Hall to the Town Clerk to affix his signature to such a document as the last remonstrance would be a sufficient justification for him in a court of law in case of a criminal prosecution; and lastly (3) Whether individuals signing such a remonstrance be liable to a prosecution of libel? To the first two questions counsel made the following answer;--"From the best information wee can get of the usage and constitution of the City the Common Hall is not empowered to do any act strictly corporate not having the direction of the City Seal. They can do no act that binds the estate of the City or that effects the admission or removal of any of its members." Then, referring to the former opinion of the Recorder just mentioned, they proceeded to say;--"wee did in concurrence with Mr. Solicitor-General and Mr. Dunning upon consideration give an opinion that a Common Hall was a lawful assembly vested with legal powers. Wee find that opinion warranted by Lord Coke's authority, and therefore without more research and enquiry than can now be made, wee cannot alter our opinion." They were further of opinion "that no Act of Common Hall can endanger the