"To-day, by post, I send you personally our private telegraphic code for use. I borrowed one from Sauer; we have only three, and I must, therefore, ask you to let me have it back in a couple of weeks. Please keep it under lock, and use it yourself _only_. It is quite possible that you will have to communicate with us, and the telegraphic service is not entirely to be trusted. I am afraid that things leak out there in one way or another." And he then drives home the advice given before: "It is honestly now the time to yield a little, however one may later again tighten the rope." One other letter must be given to complete this view of the circumstances in which the conference met. It was written on May 9th, 1899--that is to say, on the day on which Mr. Hofmeyr proposed to Lord Milner that he should accept President Steyn's good offices to arrange the conference with President Krüger. It is addressed to President Steyn, and, translated, runs as follows: "DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA. "_May 9th_, 1899. "DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,-- "I am sorry that I could not earlier fulfil my promise as to the ammunition. The reason of it is that his honour the Commandant-General [General Joubert] was away, and I could consequently not get the desired information earlier. "The General says that he has 15 to 20 (twenty) million Mauser and 10 to 12 million Martini-Henry cartridges, and if needed will be able to supply you with any of either sort. "On that score your Excellency can accordingly be at rest. "The situation looks very dark indeed, although nothing is as yet officially known to us. I trust that some change may still come in it through your proposed plan. The copies _re_ dynamite will be sent to you at the earliest opportunity. With best greeting, "Your humble servant and friend, "P. GROEBLER."[69] [Footnote 69: The original of this letter is now in the possession of Mr. E. B. Iwan Müller, by whom it was published in his work, _Lord Milner and South Africa_. The translation is that of the Department of Military Intelligence.] The Cape nationalists had asked the Republics to "play for time," because they believed that, with the return of the Liberal party to power in England, it would be possible to achieve the aims of their policy without the risk of a conflict in arms. The Republics were "playing for time," but in another sense. They were waiting until their military preparations were sufficiently complete to allow them to defy the British Government. [Sidenote: The Bloemfontein conference.]