Lord Milner's Work in South Africa: From its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902Worsfold, W. Basil (William Basil)
History
Lord Milner's Work in South Africa: From its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902
Worsfold, W. Basil (William Basil)
Milner, Alfred Milner, Viscount, 1854-1925; South African War, 1899-1902
"When on a visit to Capetown," writes Sir Percy FitzPatrick, "I
called several times upon the High Commissioner, and learning, by
private advice, that my movements were being reported in detail
through the Secret Service Department, I informed Sir Alfred
Milner of the fact. Sir Alfred admitted that the idea of secret
agents in British territory and spies round or in Government
House was not pleasant, but expressed the hope that those things
should not deter those who wished to call on him, as he was there
as the representative of Her Majesty for the benefit of British
subjects, and very desirous of ascertaining for himself the facts
of the case."[159]
[Footnote 159: _The Transvaal from Within_, p. 287.]
The Afrikander leaders in the Cape never identified themselves with
the British cause. To them the Salisbury Cabinet was a "team most
unjustly disposed towards us"; a team, moreover, which they earnestly,
and not without reason, hoped might be replaced by a Liberal
Government that would allow them undisturbed to carry forward their
plans to full fruition. The motive of their "mediation," such as it
was, was political expediency. It was not from any belief in the
justice of the British claims that they endeavoured to persuade the
republican nationalists to give way; still less from any feeling that
England's cause was their cause. When, at length, they became really
earnest in pressing President Krüger to grant a "colourable" measure
of franchise reform--to use Mr. Merriman's adjective--it was for their
own sake, and not for England's, that they worked. This motive runs
through the whole of their correspondence; but it emerges more frankly
in the urgent messages sent during the three days (September 12th to
15th) in which the Transvaal reply to the British despatch of
September 8th was being prepared. "Mind," telegraphs Mr. Hofmeyr to
Mr. Fischer on September 13th, "war will probably have a fatal effect
on the Transvaal, the Free State, and the Cape Afrikander party." And
when, from Mr. Fischer's reply, war was seen to have come in spite of
all his counsels of prudence, the racial tie asserted itself, and he
found consolation for his impotence in an expression of his hatred
against England. On September 14th Mr. Hofmeyr telegraphed to
President Steyn:
"I suppose you have seen our wires to Fischer and his replies,
which latter I deeply regret. The 'to be or not to be' of the
Transvaal, Free State, and our party at the Cape, depends upon
this decision. The trial is a severe one, but hardly so severe as
the outrageous despatches received by Brand from [Sir Philip]
Wodehouse and [Sir Henry] Barkly. The enemy then hoped that Brand
would refuse, as the Transvaal's enemy now hopes Krüger will do;
but Brand conceded, and saved the State. Follow Brand's example.
Future generations of your and my people will praise you."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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