Lord Milner's Work in South Africa: From its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902Worsfold, W. Basil (William Basil)
History
Lord Milner's Work in South Africa: From its Commencement in 1897 to the Peace of Vereeniging in 1902
Worsfold, W. Basil (William Basil)
Milner, Alfred Milner, Viscount, 1854-1925; South African War, 1899-1902
"This despatch," writes the Commander-in-Chief on April 2nd,
1901, "would be incomplete were I to omit to mention the benefit
I have derived from the unfailing support and wise counsels of
Sir Alfred Milner. I can only say here that I have felt it a high
privilege to work in close communication with one whose courage
never faltered however grave the responsibilities might be which
surrounded him, and who, notwithstanding the absorbing cares of
his office, seemed always able to find time for a helpful message
or for the tactful solution of a difficult question."
That this is no conventional compliment, even in the mouth of so great
a general as Lord Roberts, will appear from the fact that on one
occasion--to be presently noted--Lord Milner's judgment did not
entirely recommend itself at the moment to the Commander-in-Chief.
[Sidenote: An unnatural alliance.]
But such services, important as they were, are mere accidents in
comparison with the volume of continuous and concentrated effort
required to keep the machinery of administration available for the
Imperial Government in a colony in which not merely the majority of
the inhabitants, but the majority of the members of the Legislative
Assembly, and half of the ministers of the Crown, were in more or less
complete sympathy with the enemy. The Boer ultimatum, by making it
impossible for the British Government to be any longer cajoled into an
elusory settlement by Boer diplomacy, had relieved Lord Milner of a
load of anxiety, and closed a period of unparalleled physical and
mental strain. But it by no means brought Lord Milner's task to an
end. The open rebellion of the Dutch subjects of the Crown,
considerable alike in point of numbers and area, was not the most
dangerous aspect of the state of utter disaffection, or rather
demoralisation, to which the Cape Colony had been reduced by twenty
years of Dutch ascendancy and nationalist propaganda. Just as before
the ultimatum it was the influence, exercised by constitutional means,
and ostensibly in the interests of the Imperial Government, over the
Republics that brought the Salisbury Cabinet within measurable
distance of diplomatic defeat; so, during the war, what was done and
said by the Afrikander nationalists within the letter of the law
constituted in fact the most formidable obstacle to the success of the
British arms. If the Dutch in the Cape Colony had been left to
themselves, their efforts to encourage the resistance of the Boers, in
view of the rapid and effective blows struck by Lord Roberts, would
probably have been without result. But unhappily their efforts
stimulated the traditional sympathisers of the Boers in England to
fresh action; and they were themselves stimulated in turn by the
excesses of the party opposition which sprang into life again directly
Lord Roberts's campaign had relieved the British people from any fear
of military humiliation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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