Lorenzo de' Medici, the Magnificent (vol. 1 of 2)Reumont, Alfred von
History
Lorenzo de' Medici, the Magnificent (vol. 1 of 2)
Reumont, Alfred von
Medici, Lorenzo de', 1449-1492
friendship, not only because it is more sincere, but also on account
of his relationship and greater power. If Messer Gian Jacopo says
that he suspects Lorenzo of sinning against the Holy Ghost, I am of
the same opinion, and think that he doubts God’s mercy. As he has most
indecorously insulted the king and me, who am, indeed, nothing but a
poor nobleman, he will never again trust the former, and has therefore
thrown himself into the arms of the Venetians.’ The letter finishes
with the proposal that Milan should conclude a secret compact with the
king (of Naples) in order to assure himself of his assistance in case
of need. The king’s interests were identical with those of the house of
Sforza, the rivals of Venice. Only by being in league with Naples could
they oppose Florentine machinations with decisive effect. ‘The safest
way seems to me not to wait till things have taken a turn that may
allow of no alternative. I have repeatedly remarked to Duke Galeazzo
that the state of Milan is so composed that with the first buffet
of fortune, whether coming from Lodi, or Cremona, or Ghiaradadda or
elsewhere, his power may be said to come to an end.’
Feltriers, who knew Tuscan affairs as well as those of his own little
country, and who was by no means a man given to violent impulses,
explains in a letter the frame of mind which Lorenzo’s policy had
produced in King Ferrante and Sixtus IV. even before the late events.
The principal matter, Medici’s behaviour and feeling towards Milan, may
have been falsely represented. Some facts may have been imagined—and
even a certain amount of justification is not to be denied to some of
the accusations—and who knows if, as the duke suggests, Lorenzo was
not conscious of it himself. However, the letter produced no result,
for the insufficient number of troops which came from Milan arose, as
we have said, from other causes. Even the preparations of Florence were
insufficient. In order to cover the expenses, the Ten levied taxes and
borrowed money from the banks, without, however, obtaining what they
required. The clergy were exhorted to a contribution of 50,000 gold
florins, at which the monasteries broke forth into endless complaints.
On the enemy’s side they were ready first, and the promptness with
which Siena promoted the designs of the Duke of Calabria, as well
as the docility of the Perugians, who, at the Pope’s command,[257]
dissolved the compact concluded with Florence, afforded the opponents
a great advantage. Alfonso of Calabria led twenty-five squadrons,
and five hundred select mercenaries (Provvisionati); Federigo of
Montefeltro twenty squadrons of heavy cavalry, each consisting of
twenty men-at-arms and forty archers, with the attendants mounted on
auxiliary horses. The attack was expected in the Val di Chiana.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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