Luck, or Cunning, as the Main Means of Organic ModificationButler, Samuel
Philosophy
Luck, or Cunning, as the Main Means of Organic Modification
Butler, Samuel
Evolution; Natural selection
To conclude; bodily form may be almost regarded as idea and memory in a
solidified state—as an accumulation of things each one of them so tenuous
as to be practically without material substance. It is as a million
pounds formed by accumulated millionths of farthings; more compendiously
it arises normally from, and through, action. Action arises normally
from, and through, opinion. Opinion, from, and through, hypothesis.
“Hypothesis,” as the derivation of the word itself shows, is singularly
near akin to “underlying, and only in part knowable, substratum;” and
what is this but “God” translated from the language of Moses into that of
Mr. Herbert Spencer? The conception of God is like nature—it returns to
us in another shape, no matter how often we may expel it. Vulgarised as
it has been by Michael Angelo, Raffaelle, and others who shall be
nameless, it has been like every other _corruptio optimi—pessimum_: used
as a hieroglyph by the help of which we may better acknowledge the height
and depth of our own ignorance, and at the same time express our sense
that there is an unseen world with which we in some mysterious way come
into contact, though the writs of our thoughts do not run within it—used
in this way, the idea and the word have been found enduringly convenient.
The theory that luck is the main means of organic modification is the
most absolute denial of God which it is possible for the human mind to
conceive—while the view that God is in all His creatures, He in them and
they in Him, is only expressed in other words by declaring that the main
means of organic modification is, not luck, but cunning.
Footnotes
{17a} “_Nature_,” Nov. 12, 1885.
{20a} “Hist. Nat. Gén.,” tom. ii. p. 411, 1859.
{23a} “Selections, &c.” Trübner & Co., 1884. [Out of print.]
{29a} “Selections, &c., and Remarks on Romanes’ ‘Mental Intelligence in
Animals,’” Trübner & Co., 1884. pp. 228, 229. [Out of print.]
{35a} Quoted by M. Vianna De Lima in his “Exposé Sommaire,” &c., p. 6.
Paris, Delagrave, 1886.
{40a} I have given the passage in full on p. 254a of my “Selections,”
&c. [Now out of print.] I observe that Canon Kingsley felt exactly the
same difficulty that I had felt myself, and saw also how alone it could
be met. He makes the wood-wren say, “Something told him his mother had
done it before him, and he was flesh of her flesh, life of her life, and
had inherited her instinct (as we call hereditary memory, to avoid the
trouble of finding out what it is and how it comes).”—_Fraser_, June,
1867. Canon Kingsley felt he must insist on the continued personality of
the two generations before he could talk about inherited memory. On the
other hand, though he does indeed speak of this as almost a synonym for
instinct, he seems not to have realised how right he was, and implies
that we should find some fuller and more satisfactory explanation behind
this, only that we are too lazy to look for it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account