Luck, or Cunning, as the Main Means of Organic ModificationButler, Samuel
Philosophy
Luck, or Cunning, as the Main Means of Organic Modification
Butler, Samuel
Evolution; Natural selection
If any one could be found so blind to obvious inferences as to accept
natural selection, “or the preservation of favoured machines,” as the
main means of mechanical modification, we might suppose him to argue much
as follows:—“I can quite understand,” he would exclaim, “how any one who
reflects upon the originally simple form of the earliest jemmies, and
observes the developments they have since attained in the hands of our
most accomplished housebreakers, might at first be tempted to believe
that the present form of the instrument has been arrived at by
long-continued improvement in the hands of an almost infinite succession
of thieves; but may not this inference be somewhat too hastily drawn?
Have we any right to assume that burglars work by means analogous to
those employed by other people? If any thief happened to pick up any
crowbar which happened to be ever such a little better suited to his
purpose than the one he had been in the habit of using hitherto, he would
at once seize and carefully preserve it. If it got worn out or broken he
would begin searching for a crowbar as like as possible to the one that
he had lost; and when, with advancing skill, and in default of being able
to find the exact thing he wanted, he took at length to making a jemmy
for himself, he would imitate the latest and most perfect adaptation,
which would thus be most likely to be preserved in the struggle of
competitive forms. Let this process go on for countless generations,
among countless burglars of all nations, and may we not suppose that a
jemmy would be in time arrived at, as superior to any that could have
been designed as the effect of the Niagara Falls is superior to the puny
efforts of the landscape gardener?”
For the moment I will pass over the obvious retort that there is no
sufficient parallelism between bodily organs and mechanical inventions to
make a denial of design in the one involve in equity a denial of it in
the other also, and that therefore the preceding paragraph has no force.
A man is not bound to deny design in machines wherein it can be clearly
seen because he denies it in living organs where at best it is a matter
of inference. This retort is plausible, but in the course of the two
next following chapters but one it will be shown to be without force; for
the moment, however, beyond thus calling attention to it, I must pass it
by.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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