On the other hand, it may be argued that Magna Carta, while something less than a law, is also something more. A law made by the king in one national assembly might be repealed by the king in another; whereas the Great Charter was intended by the barons to be unchangeable. It was granted to them and their heirs for ever; and, in return, a price had been paid, namely, the renewal of their allegiance—a fundamental condition of John’s continued possession of the throne.[183] ----- Footnote 183: The _quid pro quo_ received by the King was merely the promise of _conditionel_ homage, dependent (as we learn from chapter 63) on his observance of the conditions of the Charter. This arrangement may be compared with the agreement made between Stephen and the Earl of Gloucester in 1136 (see _supra_, p. 120), and it bears some points of analogy with the procedure adopted by the framers of the Bill of Rights, who inserted a list of conditions in the Act of Parliament which formed the title of William and Mary to the throne of England. ----- Magna Carta has also been frequently described as a treaty. Such is the verdict of Dr. Stubbs.[184] “The Great Charter, although drawn up in the form of a royal grant, was really a treaty between the King and his subjects.... It is the collective people who really form the other high contracting party in the great capitulation.”[185] This view receives some support from certain words contained in chapter 63 of the Charter itself: “_Juratum est autem tam ex parte nostra quam ex parte baronum, quod haec omnia supradicta bona fide et sine malo ingenio observabuntur_.” ----- Footnote 184: _Const. Hist._, I. 569. Footnote 185: Mr. Prothero is of the same opinion (_Simon de Montfort_, 15). It was “in reality a treaty of peace, an engagement made after a defeat between the vanquished and his victors.” ----- It is not sufficient to urge against this theory, as is sometimes done, that the concord was entered into in bad faith by one or by both of the contracting parties. It is quite true that the compromise it contained was accepted merely as a cloak under which to prepare for war; yet jurisprudence, in treating of formal documents granted under seal, pays no attention to sincerity or insincerity, but looks merely to the formal expression of consent. Interesting questions might also be raised as to how far it is correct to extend to treaties the legal rule which declares void or voidable all compacts and agreements induced by force or fear. In a sense, every treaty which ends a great war would fall under such condemnation, since the vanquished nation always bows to _force majeure_. Such claims as the Great Charter may have to rank as a treaty are not, therefore, necessarily weakened by John’s subsequent contention that when granting it he was not a free agent.