Cf. Anson, _Law and Custom_, I. 44. “The provisions of 1215 described an assembly of a type which was already passing away.” Cf. what is said of reactionary tendencies in connection with cc. 37 and 39. ----- V. _Powers and Functions of the Council._ It was not until long after the days of Magna Carta that Parliament secured the most important of those functions now deemed essential to its existence. No claim was made by the Great Charter on behalf of the _commune concilium_ to any right to be consulted in the making of laws or in the performance of administrative or judicial duties by the Crown. No effort was made towards formulating any doctrine of ministerial responsibility. This assembly, narrow and aristocratic in its composition, had only one right secured to it by Magna Carta—namely, a limited control over one form of taxation. Even here, as we have seen, no general or sweeping claim was put forward on its behalf. It had no right to a control of the national purse: the barons confined themselves to a selfish assertion of a right to protect their own individual pockets against an increase of feudal burdens. A modern Magna Carta would have contained a careful list of the powers and privileges of “the common council of the realm,” and would have given to this list a conspicuous place of honour.[512] ----- Footnote 512: Cf. _Report on Dignity of a Peer_, I. 63, where it is mentioned as “remarkable that no one article in the Charter has reference to the previous existence of any assembly convened for general purposes of legislation; nor does the charter contain any provision for the calling of any such assembly in the future, or any provision purporting the existence by law of any representative system for the purpose of general legislation.” ----- VI. _Rights of Majorities and Minorities._ The medieval conception of constitutional solidarity was defective; the king’s council acted too much like a fortuitous gathering of unrelated individuals, and too little like a recognized organ of the body politic. Each “baron” was summoned on his own behalf, and in order that he might give his individual consent to a proposed levy; while it is doubtful how far a dissenting minority could be bound by a decision of the rest. Accordingly, the framers of Magna Carta deemed it necessary to assert what would be too obvious to modern politicians to require assertion—namely, that when the _commune concilium_ had been properly convened, its power to transact business should not be interfered with because a section of those summoned chose to stay away. “The business shall proceed on the day appointed, according to the advice of such as shall be present, although all that were summoned do not come.” Not all business was competent, however, for the cause of summons had to be mentioned in the writs. If these writs were in order, the Council, so we may presume, had power to impose aids or scutages on those who were absent.[513] -----