Magna Carta, and Other AddressesGuthrie, William D. (William Dameron)
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Magna Carta, and Other Addresses
Guthrie, William D. (William Dameron)
Constitutional law -- United States
The one great contribution which the English-speaking race has made
to the science of politics has been the representative principle. It
has been truly declared that every lasting liberty secured for the
individual, every lasting reform towards stability in government and
permanent effectiveness in administration, every lasting advancement
made in politics during the past two centuries, has been by and through
the representative system. The subordination of public officials to the
law, and their liability under the law for every illegal act, sprang
from the representative principle. The independence of the judiciary,
that great bulwark of liberty and of the rights of the individual, has
followed upon the growth and success of the representative principle.
The vivifying spirit or essence of the representative principle is the
determination of all questions of practical government by delegates or
representatives chosen by the people, who it is assumed can act more
intelligently and better discern the true interests of their country
than a multitude of voters dispersed over an extensive territory.
Government under the representative principle includes not merely
legislation by the chosen representatives of the people, but the
practical conduct of the executive department and its administrative
branches by officials selected or nominated by representatives of the
people. Despite all attacks upon our political institutions and all
instances of mistakes and maladministration, the sound common sense of
thoughtful citizens still confirms the judgment of the founders of our
government that the only safe course is to follow the representative
principle. This is as true to-day as it was when the "Federalist" was
written. The direct nomination of executive or judicial officers is in
utter disregard of that principle.
If the function of legislation is in the long run most satisfactorily
performed by a representative body composed of men from every locality
and every part of a state, and if it would be unsafe to vest the
lawmaking power in the executive branch, does it not likewise follow
that the equally important function of selecting candidates for
executive and judicial office and formulating party policies and
platforms will be better performed by a representative body, such as
delegate conventions, than by being left to the mass of voters? If
more intelligent legislation and wiser action are likely to result
from a representative body than from the confusion of a multitude of
voters, is it not also evident that more intelligent and discriminating
selection of executive officers will be made by chosen representatives,
as in nominating conventions, than by the people at large?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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