Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. MahanMahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Sea-power
The great end of a war fleet, however, is not to chase, nor to fly, but
to control the seas. Had Cervera escaped our pursuit at Santiago, it
would have been only to be again paralyzed at Cienfuegos or at Havana.
When speed, not force, is the reliance, destruction may be postponed,
but can be escaped only by remaining in port. Let it not, therefore, be
inferred, from the possible, though temporary, effect of a “fleet in
being,” that speed is the chief of all factors in the battleship. This
plausible, superficial notion, too easily accepted in these days of
hurry and of unreflecting dependence upon machinery as the all in all,
threatens much harm to the future efficiency of the navy. Not speed, but
power of offensive action, is the dominant factor in war. The decisive
preponderant element of great land forces has ever been the infantry,
which, it is needless to say, is also the slowest. The homely summary of
the art of war, “To get there first with the most men,” has with strange
perverseness been so distorted in naval—and still more in
popular—conception, that the second and more important consideration has
been subordinated to the former and less essential. Force does not exist
for mobility, but mobility for force. It is of no use to get there first
unless, when the enemy in turn arrives, you have also the most men,—the
greater force. This is especially true of the sea, because there
inferiority of force—of gun power—cannot be compensated, as on land it
at times may be, by judiciously using accidents of the ground. I do not
propose to fall into an absurdity of my own by questioning the
usefulness of higher speed, _provided_ the increase is not purchased at
the expense of strictly offensive power; but the time has come to say
plainly that its value is being exaggerated; that it is in the
battleship secondary to gun power; that a battle fleet can never attain,
nor maintain, the highest rate of any ship in it, except of that one
which at the moment is the slowest, for it is a commonplace of naval
action that fleet speed is that of the slowest ship; that not
exaggerated speed, but uniform speed—sustained speed—is the requisite of
the battle fleet; that it is not machinery, as is often affirmed, but
brains and guns, that win battles and control of the sea. The true speed
of war is not headlong precipitancy, but the unremitting energy which
wastes no time.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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