Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. MahanMahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Sea-power
[As the date indicates, the essay was written at the time of the
Revolution in Hawaii, six years before its annexation. The part of the
essay preceding points out the predominant interest of the United States
in the Islands owing to their control of our trade routes and naval
approaches, and refers to the benefit to the world from British colonial
expansion.—EDITOR.]
But if a plea of the world’s welfare seem suspiciously like a cloak for
national self-interest, let the latter be accepted frankly as the
adequate motive which it assuredly is. Let us not shrink from pitting a
broad self-interest against the narrow self-interest to which some would
restrict us. The demands of our three great seaboards, the Atlantic, the
Gulf, and the Pacific,—each for itself, and all for the strength that
comes from drawing closer the ties between them,—are calling for the
extension, through the Isthmian Canal, of that broad sea common along
which, and along which alone, in all the ages prosperity has moved. Land
carriage, always restricted and therefore always slow, toils enviously
but hopelessly behind, vainly seeking to replace and supplant the royal
highway of nature’s own making. Corporate interests, vigorous in that
power of concentration which is the strength of armies and of
minorities, may here withstand for a while the ill-organized strivings
of the multitude, only dimly conscious of its wants; yet the latter,
however temporarily opposed and baffled, is sure at last, like the blind
forces of nature, to overwhelm all that stand in the way of its
necessary progress. So the Isthmian Canal is an inevitable part in the
future of the United States; yet one that cannot be separated from other
necessary incidents of a policy dependent upon it, whose details cannot
be foreseen exactly. But because the precise steps that hereafter may be
opportune or necessary cannot yet be foretold certainly, is not a reason
the less, but a reason the more, for establishing a principle of action
which may serve to guide as opportunities arise. Let us start from the
fundamental truth, warranted by history, that the control of the seas,
and especially along the great lines drawn by national interest or
national commerce, is the chief among the merely material elements in
the power and prosperity of nations. It is so because the sea is the
world’s great medium of circulation. From this necessarily follows the
principle that, as subsidiary to such control, it is imperative to take
possession, when it can be done righteously, of such maritime positions
as contribute to secure command. If this principle be adopted, there
will be no hesitation about taking the positions—and they are many—upon
the approaches to the Isthmus, whose interests incline them to seek us.
It has its application also to the present case of Hawaii.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account