“The Problem of Asia” (1900), pp. 124–127. Footnote 27: “Naval Strategy,” pp. 266–272. Footnote 28: “Naval Strategy,” pp. 277–280. Footnote 29: “Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812,” Vol. I, pp. 284–290. Footnote 30: “History of the United States,” Vol. VIII, chap. VIII. Footnote 31: “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” p. 138. Footnote 32: This immunity of enemy property in neutral ships, guaranteed by the Declaration of Paris in 1856, has been to a large extent nullified in recent practice by extension of the lists of contraband, to say nothing of the violations of all law in submarine warfare.—EDITOR. Footnote 33: “Naval Strategy,” pp. 303–304, 356–367, 381–382. Footnote 34: “Naval Administration and Warfare” (1903), pp. 5–11. Footnote 35: “Naval Administration and Warfare” (1903). pp. 26–31. Footnote 36: “Naval Administration and Warfare” (1903), pp. 46–48. Footnote 37: These bureaus are seven in number: Yards and Docks, Navigation, Ordnance, Construction and Repairs, Steam Engineering, Supplies and Accounts, and Medicine and Surgery. The Chief of Naval Operations, whose office was created in 1915, stands second to the Secretary and acts as his expert professional adviser, with the specific task of co-ordinating the work of the navy, preparing plans, and directing operations in war. He is, _ex officio_, a member of the General Board of the Navy, created in 1900, which serves as an expert advisory body.—EDITOR. Footnote 38: “Retrospect and Prospect,” pp. 258–259, 270–272. Footnote 39: “The Interest of America in Sea Power” (1896), pp. 192–200. Footnote 40: Bombardment of _undefended_ ports, towns, etc., is forbidden by Convention IX of the Hague conference of 1907, with the broad concession, however, that depots, store houses, and all constructions that serve military purposes may be destroyed.—EDITOR. Footnote 41: “The Influence of Sea Power upon History” (1660–1783), pp. 197–200. Admiral Mahan’s major historical works treat consecutively the history of naval warfare from 1660 to 1815; and his essays and shorter studies cover subsequent wars. The selections in Part II are arranged in chronological order.—EDITOR. Footnote 42: “The Influence of Sea Power upon History,” pp. 63–67. Footnote 43: An interesting proof of the weight attributed to the naval power of Great Britain by a great military authority will be found in the opening chapter of Jomini’s “History of the Wars of the French Revolution.” He lays down, as a fundamental principle of European policy, that an unlimited expansion of naval force should not be permitted to any nation which cannot be approached by land,—a description which can apply only to Great Britain. Footnote 44: