Yamagata’s ambition did not extend very far at first, for the army was to consist of only 20,000 men, all told. But it was intended that these should be well drilled, with additions to their ranks later on, and in gaining proficiency in military exercises they served to leaven the whole mass of the male population, and imbue it with a notion of the high standard of efficiency which defenders of the realm were expected to attain. Not until after the war with China, however, which will be referred to in detail in its proper place, was the Japanese army really formidable in point of numbers. But under the plan for which Marshal Yamagata was directly responsible, there grew up an enormous reserve, far in excess of anything for which the rest of the world was prepared to give Japan credit. Parenthetically, it may be mentioned that even down to the end of 1904 the tremendous strength which Japan is able to put forth had not, save in a very limited circle, been in the faintest degree appreciated, and least of all, perhaps, in Russia. At the time of the outbreak of war in the island of Kiushiu in 1877 General Yamagata was at headquarters in Tokio, and it may well be comprehended that there was some anxiety in his mind concerning the behaviour of the new army when confronted by the redoubtable swordsmen of the great southern clan. The heimin of whom the imperial army was largely composed were comparatively unaccustomed to the use of weapons of warfare, and it remained to be seen how they would comport themselves in the face of a peculiarly strong and agile foe. The Satsuma onslaught was famed for its irresistible vigour and determination. It was at least open to question if the men who had only recently begun to handle the bayonet would with it be a match for swordsmen whose tactics were to come to close quarters on every occasion and to some extent despised musketry as an art unworthy of their knightly training. But the outcome of the struggle justified the sanguine anticipations which the military authorities at Tokio had formed regarding the value of the new force, and increased confidence was felt in its future development. It was not the first trial that it had undergone in actual warfare, for some regiments had been through a rather severe campaign,—not in respect of the fighting that they had to do, but in regard to the climate and the character of the country—in the island of Formosa three years before the contest with Satsuma occurred, yet the civil war in Kiushiu was a test of a far more rigorous nature, and one on which the fate of the Government’s scheme of reform in no small degree depended. Suffice it to say that the confidence Yamagata had placed in his military system was amply warranted by events, and as references are to be found elsewhere to the incidents of the campaign it would be superfluous to enter into detail concerning them here.