Malthus, T. R. (Thomas Robert), 1766-1834; Malthusianism
of readers, or liable to be misunderstood.”[469] If any word must have a
different meaning from that adopted by either of these authorities, the
new sense must not only be free from the faults of the old, but must
have a clear and recognizable positive usefulness. The new definitions
should be consistent with the old; and the same terms should be used in
the same sense, except where inveterate custom insists on an exception.
When all is done, it is still impossible in a social science like
political economy to find a definition entirely beyond cavil.[470]
“Wealth” must include all the “material objects that are necessary,
useful, or agreeable to mankind;”[471] “productive labour” must be the
labour which realizes itself either in such material objects or the
increased value of them; or else we wander from common language, and our
discussions travel off into indefiniteness. Economical reasoning must be
a deduction from observed facts of nature and of human nature verified
by general experience. Malthus professes to have used this cautious
method throughout, and the theory of population was only the particular
instance where circumstances enabled him to make his verification most
complete. “I should never have had that steady and unshaken confidence
in the theory of population which I have invariably felt, if it had not
appeared to me to be confirmed, in the most remarkable manner, by the
state of society as it actually exists in every country with which we
are acquainted.”[472] On the other hand, Ricardo, legislating for
Saturn, gives us little or no verification by experience. It is true
that he admits qualifications and exceptions to his own statements; and
he would have winced a little at his own biographer’s assertion that
“Mr. Ricardo paid comparatively little attention to the practical
application of general principles; his is not a practical work.”[473]
But he makes no use of the admissions; his illustrations as a rule are
not historical, but imaginary cases and the verification is wanting. In
a letter to Malthus (written on the 24th November, 1820) he says: “Our
differences may in some respects, I think, be ascribed to your
considering my book as more practical than I intended it to be. My
object was to elucidate principles, and to do this I imagined strong
cases, that I might show the operation of these principles.”[474] In
Malthus and Adam Smith, imaginary cases are rare exceptions, actual
examples from life or history are the rule. Malthus goes so far in this
direction that (to use his own phraseology) he is tempted to subordinate
science to “utility.” Even Adam Smith, though he had abundance of
good-will to his kind, did not write to do good but to expound truth. To
Malthus the discovery of truth was less important than the improvement
of society. When an economical truth could not be made the means of
improvement, he seems to have lost interest in it. His pointed warning
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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